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Summary: The EU, as a political project, has suffered immense damage from the accusation of 
being a neo- liberal entity pursuing neo- liberal policies. The neo-liberal caricature is highly 
unfortunate as not only the legal provisions upon which the EU is founded do not embody any 
neo- liberal bias, there is also little evidence to support that EU policies encourage a race to the 
bottom. In most instances, fantasies rather than facts govern the discussion as it is politically 
more convenient to blame an indeterminate “foreign” entity, and eventually foreigners, than to 
confront national vested interests or address national failures to enforce the law of the land. The 
EU should not be seen as a foreign body with its own (neo- liberal) will. It is a framework the 
Member States can rely on to confront collective challenges and threats. It is up to the Member 
States to ultimately agree on the definition of sound policies in order for Europe to preserve itself 
from unregulated economic competition. The provisions of the current Treaties, and a fortiori the 
provisions of the Constitutional Treaty, offer a balanced set of values and objectives. They do not 
presage, in themselves, a neo- liberal or socialist orientation. Instead of denouncing the supposed 
neo- liberal nature of the European Treaties, left- leaning critics should realise that ideological 
conflicts and divergent national interests are the genuine obstacles to European “re-regulation” in 
the direction of a more “social Europe”. 
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Malitiis non est indulgendum  
On The European Union’s Alleged Neo-Liberal Bias 
 
“It is clear that the neo-liberal economic agenda is now firmly 
enshrined within the draft constitution. The thrust of its 
commercial policy is clearly to optimise profit-making 
opportunities for business, at the expense of public welfare and 
the public good”   
Patricia McKenna, MEP1 
“In the American Constitution, the Bill of Rights stipulates that 
individual rights prevail over the collectivist rights and the 
power of the State. In the European Constitution, the new 
European statists turn it on its head, and collectivist or group 
“rights” trump individuals and individual rights. This is the 
“New Europe”. It’s the world Orwell, a socialist, warned about 
50 years ago. In the name of some vague utopian goal, the 
lifeblood of society is drained. Society becomes an empty shell, 
obedient only to the order of the state”  
Richard Pollock2 
 
1. To put it concisely, the EU Constitutional Treaty, 3 in itself, is neither neo-liberal nor socialist. 
It remains a balanced framework embodying the values and objectives of the so-called “European 
social model”. 4 While there is no authoritative definition of such a model, the European Council 
described it as a model based on good economic performance, competitiveness, a high level of 
                                                 
1 Quoted by Paul Cullen, “Warning that treaty could destroy public funding”, The Irish Times, December 12, 2003. 
2 “The New Europe Looks a Little Like ‘1984’”, Cato Institute, July 8, 2003 (available at 
http://www.cato.org/dailys/07-08-03.html ). 
3 Its formal title is “Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe” but is commonly known as the “EU Constitutional 
Treaty” or as the “EU Constitution”. It was adopted by the 25 Heads of State and Government in Brussels on 17 and 
18 June 2004 and was formally signed in Rome on 29 October 2004. It is based on an initial draft prepared by the 
European Convention and presented to the Thessaloniki European Council on 20 June 2003. The full text of the 
Constitution is available on the website: http://europa.eu.int/futurum. If unanimously ratified, this Treaty establishing 
a Constitution for Europe shall repeal the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC) and the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU). However, since it was rejected by referendum in both France and the Netherlands, it may 
well never enter into force. For a brief overview of the ratification conundrum, see L. Pech, “Non-sense: France’s No 
to the European Constitution”, available at: http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy /2005/05/non-sense-frances-no-to-
european.php.  
4 For an argument that similarities in industrial relations, social budgets, social protection systems and the 
organisation of services of general interest “have sculpted a typically European way of conceptualising and 
promoting social protection”, see Marjorie Jouen and Catherine Papant, Social Europe in the throes of enlargement, 
Notre Europe, Policy Papers No. 15, July 2005 (available at: www.notre-europe.asso.fr), p. 4. 
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social protection and education and social dialogue.5 The Council also noted that the European 
social model allows for a diversity of approaches in order to achieve shared European values and 
objectives and that this diversity should be treated as an asset and a source of strength. 6  
2. The Constitutional Treaty does not depart from this model. Social values and objectives 
complement economic requirements. Reproducing the rules of the current Treaties, the EU is 
granted with the power to complement the action of the Member States in a certain number of 
enumerated fields. As with the present Treaties, the constitutional text does not pre-empt the 
political direction of future EU intervention. In other words, it is left to European institutions, and 
in particular the Member States within the Council of Ministers, to subsequently balance 
competing objectives and define sound public policies. To denounce the constitutional text or the 
current Treaties as a neo- liberal plot does not simply make sense. The charge is particularly 
ridiculous when considered in light of the incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
into the Constitutional Treaty, a Charter that has been presented, especially in the United 
Kingdom, as a socialist enterprise with its guarantee of socio-economic rights.  
3. A brief and preliminary digression on liberalism may be useful. The word itself has become 
quite pejorative in some quarters. This is certainly a troubling trend. Politically speaking, indeed, 
all constitutional democracies embody liberalism. A constitution, for instance, is the emblematic 
set of rules of any authentic liberal regime. Historically, as a political doctrine, liberalism is 
characterised by its emphasis on individual freedom, the free selection of governors and 
economic freedom. As an economic doctrine, the philosophy of liberalism can be summed up by 
the expression “laissez-faire”, meaning that the advocates of such philosophy oppose, as a matter 
of principle, governmental regulation of commerce beyond the minimum necessary for a free-
enterprise system to operate according to the laws of supply and demand. From a vision stressing 
the limited role the state should play in the economy, the advocates of liberalism have been 
arguing that the state should have a minimal role following the crisis of the “welfare state” since 
the mid-seventies. In this context, the neologism “neo-liberalism” has gained an extreme 
popularity, in particular since the strengthening of “anti-globalisation” movements in the last 
decade. The exact meaning of neo- liberalism remains nonetheless ambiguous. At a minimum, it 
                                                 
5 European Council of Barcelona, March 15-16, 2002, Presidency Conclusions, at 9 (available at: 
http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm). 
6 See European Social Agenda, Annex I, European Council of Nice, December 7-9, 2002, Presidency Conclusions 
(available at: http://europa.eu.int/european_council/conclusions/index_en.htm). 
(01/03/2006) 
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can loosely be described as a policy orientation favouring liberalisation, privatisation and 
deregulation. Irrespective of its precise meaning, it has been used as a powerful rhetorical tool to 
undermine public support in European integration in general and in the Constitutional Treaty in 
particular. 
 
I. – The Entrenchment of Laissez-Faire  
 
4. One remarkable feature of the French referendum campaign on the Constitutional Treaty was 
the focus of critics on the Third Part of this text, which deals with the policies and the functioning 
of the EU. Many left- leaning critics were allegedly alarmed to discover detailed provisions 
guaranteeing not only the free movement of goods and capital but also free and undistorted 
competition throughout Europe. Those provisions, the argument runs, clearly confirm the neo-
liberal bias of the EU. To give a typical example of the still prevalent Manichaeism in the debate 
on the Constitutional Treaty, Susan George, a Franco-American academic and vice-president of 
ATTAC France (Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens), 
found the choice to be clear-cut:  
“I believe people in France have understood a momentous truth. We were being asked to choose between a 
Europe which would, in the fullness of time, ensure that we were all subjected to an American-style, neo-
liberal model based on competition and the survival of the fittest, accompanied by huge inequality; or that 
we had one final chance to defend a genuine European model of solidarity and social justice.”7  
5. Such reactions and manifest exaggerations are certainly surprising in so far as the very idea of 
a common market in Europe demands free movement and free competition. And indeed, since its 
origins, the aim of the Treaty of Rome has been to eliminate all obstacles to intra-community 
trade in order to merge national markets into a single market, with the hope of maximizing 
consumer welfare and ensuring the most efficient use of our resources. As we shall see, left-
leaning critics have clearly demonstrated their prejudice towards the EU as they based their 
“analysis” too often on a very limited set of legal rules found in the current Treaties and in the 
Constitutional Treaty, to the exception of rules likely to demonstrate the fallacious character of 
their thesis.  
                                                 
7 Susan George, “France’s “non” marks just the beginning of our campaign”, Europe’s World, Autumn 2005, p. 50.  
(01/03/2006) 
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6. This is not to say that the EU cannot be criticised. Furthermore, the range and content of its 
public policies ought to be constantly scrutinised and debated. To denounce, however, the 
inherent neo-liberal nature of European integration does not do justice to the values and 
objectives upon which the EU is founded and the numerous public policies that illustrate its 
social dimension. In the end, it must always be remembered that “Brussels” may act only if it has 
the power to do so. In other words, it is for the Member States to decide whether or not they want 
to grant the EU with more powers in the social field. This could represent a positive evolution but 
unsurprisingly, most, if not all the Member States, are very reluctant to transfer any of their 
welfare-state functions. Accordingly, the EU may have a more dominant “economic” dimension 
because the Member States predominantly want the EU to be an economic entity. Yet, to identify 
the fulfilment of these economic responsibilities with a neo- liberal agenda illustrates a seriously 
misguided attempt. This charge completely betrays the past and current efforts of balancing the 
economic and social dimension of European integration and further illustrates a profound 
miscomprehension of the limited mandate of the EU. 
 
A. – The Social Market Economy 
 
7. The reference to a “social market economy” at Article I-3(3) of the Constitutional Treaty has 
revealed deep and embarrassing ignorance. This reference to a market economy has been 
presented as a distressing novelty. However, Article 4 TEC, Article 98 TEC and Article 105 TEC 
already refer to the concept of an open market economy. 8 Particularly ridiculous was the 
argument raised by some non-Weberian “experts” according to which the Constitutional Treaty is 
the capitalistic equivalent of the USSR Constitution. For those critics, these two texts are the only 
                                                 
8 Article 4(1) TEC reads as follows: “For the purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Member States and the 
Community shall include … the adoption of an economic policy which is based on the close coordination of Member 
States’ economic policies, on the internal market and on the definition of common objectives, and conducted in 
accordance with the principle of an open market economy with free competition.” Article 98 TEC provides that the 
Member States and the Community, when conducting their economic policies, “shall act in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 4.” And according to Article 105(1) TEC, the European system of 
central banks “shall support the general economic policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the 
achievement of the objectives of the Community as laid down in Article 2” and “shall act in accordance with the 
principle of an open market economy with free competition, favouring an efficient allocation of resources, and in 
compliance with the principles set out in Article 4.” 
(01/03/2006) 
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examples of constitutions embodying the economic principle upon which the society is organised. 
It is difficult to know where to begin with this kind of statement. First of all, pragmatically, one 
may ask if there is an effective alternative to a market economy such as a North Korean or a 
Cuban type of socialism perhaps? An astonishing aspect of the French political debate was the 
violence of the attacks on the constitutional reference to a social market economy. It appears that 
many advocates of the no-camp feigned not to realise that the French economy is also a market 
economy and quite a productive one. Yet, no major political leader was forthcoming in an 
explanation that a market economy means no more than an economic system where factors of 
production are privately owned and where supply and demand determine to a certain extent the 
allocation of resources.  
8. Second, the comparison with the USSR Constitution is beyond belief. It is actually in light of 
the German constitutional experience that Article I-3(3) of the Constitutional Treaty was 
elaborated. To the author’s knowledge, no reference was however ever made in mainstream 
French media to the German constitutional “principle of social statehood” as embodied in Article 
20(1) of the German Basic Law: “The Federal Republic of Germany is a democratic and social 
federal state”. 9 As the EU could not be compared to a state, the drafters of the Constitutional 
Treaty apparently contented themselves with a reference to a “social market economy”. But 
again, the latter expression is “a concept with a long German history” and “is understood to be an 
approach to fulfil the task of the German state to perform as a “social state.”10 According to a 
German Professor of Economics, Alfred Müller-Armack, who invented the term in 1946, a social 
market economy promotes interventionist state measures and redistributive policies.11 The 
subtlety is that social goals cannot be attained through instruments undermining the functionality 
of market mechanisms. In any case, it is astonishing to condemn the term “social market 
economy” for its alleged neo-liberal overtone. The term in itself does not favour public policies 
promoting privatisation and deregulation. It merely describes the current economic framework of 
European countries: they are all market economies with a high level of social protection.  Besides, 
to say no to the Constitutional Treaty leads to a paradoxical result. Indeed, it means that the 
                                                 
9 See Christian Joerges and Florian Rödl, ““Social Market Economy” as Europe’s Social Model?”, EUI Working 
Paper Law No. 2004/8 (available at: www.iue.it), p. 10.  
10 Ibid., p. 11. The authors also signal that the expression “social market economy” was legalised in the Treaty on the 
Unification of Germany (1990) as the basis of the economic unification. 
11 Ibid., p. 16. 
(01/03/2006) 
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current supposedly “neo- liberal” provisions according to which the Member States are to adopt 
an economic policy conducted in accordance with the principle of an open market economy with 
free competition, are simply maintained. 
9. The dishonesty of the neo-liberal charge becomes particularly apparent once Article I-3(3) of 
the Constitutional Treaty is read in its entirety:  
“The Union shall work for the sustainable development of Europe based on balanced economic growth and 
price stability, a highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, 
and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment. It shall promote scientific 
and technological advance.  
It shall combat social exclusion and discrimination, and shall promote social justice and protection, equality 
between women and men, solidarity between generations and protection of the rights of the child.  
It shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States.  
It shall respect its rich cultural and linguistic diversity, and shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is 
safeguarded and enhanced.” 
10. The Constitutional Treaty therefore speaks of a competitive European market economy 
because it is actually a means to fulfil social goals, which happen to be innovative ones. The 
criticism stressing that a market economy cannot be referred to as a constitutional objective is 
therefore surprising and misguided. Indeed, Article I-3 merely provides that the EU is based on a 
market economy as this is the best framework to attain a series of social objectives. And to 
answer criticism coming from the self-proclaimed “progressists” who highlight the fact there is 
no constitutional precedent with regard to the inclusion of the notion of “market economy”, one 
may ask a contrario with no historical precedent in the constitut ional texts of democratic 
societies, should the reference to “social progress”, “social exclusion” or “solidarity between 
generations” also be found illegitimate? Comparisons with current national constitutions should 
not be one-sided if one’s goal is to genuinely inform the citizenry. It is therefore dishonest in 
order to demonstrate the reality of a neo- liberal conspiracy to solely emphasise that the reference 
to a social market economy is somewhat constitutionally unprecedented. The Constitutional 
Treaty also offers an original and impressive list of social objectives, which would hardly be 
found in the constitutional wish list of a neo- liberal.   
11. Leading left-leaning politicians and commentators are mysteriously selective in their reading 
of the constitutional text in light of the current European Treaties. If they undertook, in good 
(01/03/2006) 
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faith, a genuine reading of this document they might well have discovered among the “provisions 
of general application”, 12 an unprecedented affirmation that the EU’s policies must contribute to 
the achievement of a set of social objectives:  
“In defining and implementing the policies and actions referred to this Part [Part III on the policies and 
functioning of the EU], the Union shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a high 
level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, and a 
high level of education, training and protection of human health.”13 
12. Is it worth mentioning that other “provisions of general application” would oblige the EU, 
were the Constitutional Treaty to be ratified, to pursue the following objectives: to eliminate 
inequalities, to combat discrimination, to promote sustainable development and take into account 
consumer protection as well as animal welfare. The added-value of the constitutional text, 
therefore, is to treat these objectives as horizontal ones, i.e. they must govern the definition and 
implementation of all EU policies such as, for instance, monetary policy. In addition to these 
innovative “provisions of general application” and in particular, the general “social clause”, the 
section on social policy may be also examined. Again, an extensive set of social objectives are 
enumerated:  
“the promotion of employment, improved living and working conditions, so as to make possible their 
harmonisation while the improvement is being maintained, proper social protection, dialogue between 
management and labour, the development of human resources with a view to lasting high employment and 
the combating of exclusion.”14  
13. To the likely horror of some ideological defenders of a “free market”, it is further specified at 
Article III-210 of the Constitutional Treaty that in order to achieve these objectives, the Union 
shall support and complement the activities of the Member States in the following fields:  
(a) improvement in particular of the working environment to protect workers’ health and safety; 
(b) working conditions; 
(c) social security and social protection of workers; 
(d) protection of workers where their employment contract is terminated; 
(e) the information and consultation of workers; 
                                                 
12 See Articles III-115 to III-122. 
13 Article III-117. 
14 Article III-209. 
(01/03/2006) 
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(f) representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, including 
codetermination, subject to paragraph 6;15 
(g) conditions of employment for third-country nationals legally residing in Union territory; 
(h) the integration of persons excluded from the labour market, without prejudice to Article III-283; 
(i) equality between women and men with regard to labour market opportunities and treatment at work; 
(j) the combating of social exclusion; 
(k) the modernisation of social protection systems without prejudice to point (c). 
It is important to highlight that the Constitutional Treaty, in this instance, only reproduces the 
current provisions of the EC Treaty signed in Rome in 1957. In other words, regarding social 
policy, the constitutional text does not alter the present allocation of competence between the EU 
and the Member States. European social policy has never been intended to replace national social 
policy. It is not entirely clear if this is the objective actually entertained by those denunciating the 
neo- liberal character of the Constitutional Treaty. If their criticism is based, however, on the fact 
the constitutional text does not encompass the creation of a European welfare state, one has to 
demonstrate, first, that there is a compelling majority of Member States willing to contemplate 
such a revolutionary objective. Generally speaking, the third part of the Constitutional Treaty 
preserves the existing – and already protective in the author’s view – acquis communautaire,16 
while better emphasizing the social dimension of its policies. To give two examples of the 
preservation of the acquis: the constitutional text requires each Member State to “ensure that the 
principle of equal pay for female and male workers for equal work or work of equal value is 
applied”;17 the Member States are also encouraged “to maintain the existing equivalence between 
paid holiday schemes”. 18  
14. As for a better emphasis of the Union’s social dimension, the explicit recognition of the role 
of the social partners19 serves as a good example. Social partners have always been involved in 
the European decision-making process and several provisions of the EC Treaty make reference to 
them. Yet, a general provision recognising their role and the importance of social dialogue was 
                                                 
15 This Article shall not apply to pay, the right of association, the right to strike or the right to impose lockouts. 
16 The body of common rights and obligations which bind all the Member States together within the European 
Union. 
17 Article III-214 reproduces Article 141 TEC. 
18 Article III-215 reproduces Article 142 TEC. 
19 Principally the representatives of employers and employees. 
(01/03/2006) 
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missing. Article I-48 of the Constitutional Treaty remedies this shortcoming. It provides that the 
EU “shall recognise and promote the role of the social partners at its level, taking into account the 
diversity of national systems” and that it shall also facilitate social dialogue. Also formalised is 
the role played by the “Tripartite Social Summit for Growth and Employment”, a product of the 
so-called “Lisbon process”. 20 In practice, it means that European institutions should promote the 
consultation of management and labour and involve them in the decision-making process 
whenever the topic may be related to employment law and labour market regulation. To put it 
bluntly, this is hardly an innovation nor is it an improvement. From the start, the EU has paid 
attention to social actors and consulted them on proposals and on the implementation of 
Community social policies. One may refer, for instance, to the creation of the European 
Economic and Social Committee in 1957, modelled on a similar French body and which was 
created under the French Constitution of 1946 and maintained by the constitutional text now in 
force in France.21 Moreover, and to focus solely on the role of social partners, the EC Treaty 
already guarantees their involvement. The Commission must consult the representatives of 
“management and labour” before submitting proposals in the social policy field and Member 
States may entrust them with the implementation of certain directives.22 More ambitiously, 
employee and employer federations can negotiate collective agreements which can be given legal 
effect by a Council directive.23  
15. With these provisions in mind, it would seem difficult to argue that the Constitutional Treaty 
embodies a neo- liberal “rule of the jungle”, a model based on the survival of the fittest. It may 
certainly be argued it does not improve the current status quo on social policy as it merely 
reproduces provisions of the EC Treaty. This is not, however, the path taken by some born-again 
Marxists of the French socialist party. Unfortunately, a great deal of voters appeared to have been 
convinced that irrespective of the provisions mentioned above, the section on social policy was 
                                                 
20 In March 2000, the EU Heads of States and Governments agreed in Lisbon to make the EU “the most competitive 
and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010.” Among numerous initiatives, it was agreed that successive 
European Councils would offer management and labour the opportunity to give their point of view on the issues 
discussed by the Council.  
21 The European Economic and Social Committee consists of representatives of the various economic and social 
components of organised civil society. It appears to function more effectively than its French counterpart which is 
too often staffed with politicians’ cronies. 
22 See Articles 137-139 TEC. 
23 Six agreements, including two sectoral agreements, have been subject to this procedure: agreement on parental 
leave; agreement on part-time work; agreement on fixed-term contracts; agreement on the organisation of working 
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no more than a fig- leaf on unrestrained neo- liberalism. In particular, two arguments have been 
advanced again and again. First, social harmonisation is left to the mercy of the market. Second, 
the EU’s social objectives are in reality undermined by several references to economic principles.  
16. Regarding the first argument, the focus of most criticism was the assertion according to which 
the fulfilment of the EU’s social objectives “will ensue not only from the functioning of the 
internal market, which will favour the harmonisation of social systems, but also from the 
procedures provided for in the Constitution and from the approximation of provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action of the Member States”. 24 The reference to the 
functioning of the internal market as a way to favour harmonisation was denounced by some 
French socialists as allowing a diminution of worker’s rights and of social protection. Not 
mentioning the fact that this provision of the Constitutional Treaty purely duplicates Article 136 
TEC, such critique does not do full justice to the exact wording of the provision. Public 
authorities will intervene to the extent market mechanisms have failed to achieve the desired 
outcome. And indeed, it is foreseen that the EU may establish minimum requirements in the 
fields mentioned in Article III-210, with the sole (and sound) condition that such intervention 
shall avoid imposing administrative, financial and legal constraints in a way which would hold 
back the creation and development of small and medium-sized undertakings. Again, the current 
Treaties as well as the Constitutional Treaty offer a balanced framework: social progress goes in 
hand with the recognition that the existence and nurturing of productive firms is a condition sine 
qua non. The following may be obvious to most people but the French debate makes it worth 
repeating: the lack of wealth creation can only lead to a situation where a welfare state is left 
without resources to redistribute.  
17. This defence has been criticised on the ground it does not take into account a key-element: 
the condition of unanimity voting within the Council of Ministers.25 It is argued that European 
intervention on social matters will continue to be a pure mirage and therefore, social standards 
                                                 
24 Article III-209. 
25 As required by Article III-210(3). As under the current EC Treaty, unanimity in the Council of Ministers remains 
the norm in the following areas: social security and social protection of workers; protection of workers where their 
employment contract is terminated; representation and collective defence of the interests of workers and employers, 
including co-determination subject to paragraph 6; conditions of employment for third country nationals legally 
residing in Community territory; financial contributions for promotion of employment and job creation. It is however 
possible for the Council of Ministers, since the Nice Treaty, to relinquish unanimity voting in favour of majority 
voting in the areas of employment contract termination, of representation and collective defence of the interests of 
workers and employers and of conditions of employment for third country nationals.  
(01/03/2006) 
 
    
© Laurent Pech  
15 
will continue to be left to the market. This is certainly one way of looking at the unanimity 
requirement. It can also be interpreted as a guarantee for countries such as France or Sweden in 
order to avoid a “neo- liberal” harmonisation of social systems, i.e. harmonisation at a lower level. 
What if the United Kingdom were to convince a majority of the Member States to harmonise 
social systems according to its ideological preferences? The French would certainly then call for 
a unanimous vote. Besides, it is not reasonable for a Member State to denounce unanimity only in 
those areas where it is willing to go further against the will of some. France, for instance, is more 
or less the sole Member State keen on defending the notion of “public service”. And, as we shall 
see, its partners have always succumbed to French demands. Indeed, the present Treaties now 
preserve the freedom for each Member State to refuse the liberalisation of major sectors of the 
national economy. Finally, the unanimity requirement is not in reality prevalent across the board 
contrary to what is usually affirmed. Similarly with the current rules, unanimity is reserved to the 
“sensitive” areas most notably in the areas of social security; protection of workers where their 
employment contract is terminated; representation and collective defence of the interests of 
workers; conditions of employment for third country nationals residing within the EU. More 
fundamentally, regardless of the unanimity versus majority voting debate, the argumentation of 
the French Socialist Party and others is lacking sophistication and does not do full justice to the 
immense complexity of the area. As Fritz Scharpf perfectly explained it, the normative and 
structural diversity of national welfare states make uniform European legislation in the social-
policy an impossible goal to reach. 26 If the level of relatively low minimal standards now being 
defined at the European level is judged not to be acceptable, one has to offer feasible solutions on 
how to accommodate the exis ting diversity of national welfare regimes with a potential 
“Europeanization” of social policies.27  
18. As for the undermining of the social objectives enunciated in the Constitutional Treaty, critics 
have principally focused on references to “the need to maintain the competitiveness of the Union 
economy” (Article III-209) or the commitment to free competition (e.g. Article III-177). The 
                                                 
26 See his stimulating study, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity” (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 645. 
27 The so-called Open Method of Coordination is now being presented as the panacea to this conundrum. Briefly 
speaking, the Open Method of Coordination is aimed at encouraging Member States to co-ordinate their actions in a 
number of policy areas on a voluntary basis without resorting to European legislation. For a general overview in the 
social field, see D. Trubek and L. Trubek, “Hard and Soft Law in the Construction of Social Europe: the Role of the 
Open Method of Co-ordination” (2005) 11 European Law Journal 343. 
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merits of this claim will be addressed infra. Nonetheless, it should be said at this stage that it 
appears to illustrate, more generally, the difficulties of explaining a text which calls itself a 
“constitution” while it merely sets out rules for a non-state entity which has been granted more 
economic missions than social competences. In addition to this peculiar feature, one should also 
mention the particular understanding of the French population of what a constitutional text should 
be composed of. French constitutional history has led French citizens to associate the idea of a 
constitution with a “short” text that should include human rights and social objectives but no 
provisions on the economic system or the content of public policies. The drafters of the 
Constitutional Treaty, a document containing no less than 448 Articles with a whole part 
detailing EU policies, should have realised how difficult it would be to explain and defend such a 
document in the context of a referendum.  
 
B. – A Market where Competition is Free and Undistorted 
 
19. Often faced with unambiguous constitutional provisions that run counter to their thesis, the 
proponents of the neo- liberal bias generally attempt to demonstrate its validity by referring to the 
number of times the word “market” or the word “competition” appear in the constitutional text:  
“The Constitution went into enormous detail concerning economic policies, stressing free market [78 
references], competition [over 100] and stressed again and again the needs of capital over those of 
people.”28 
From these numbers, it is hence hastily concluded that the Constitutional Treaty embodies the 
quintessence of neo- liberalism. If there is a need to show the insipidity, or even, the stupidity of 
this line of reasoning sadly propagated by some academics as well as a former French socialist 
Prime Minister and his fans, one could refer to the number of times the words “employment” or 
“social” are mentioned. Our personal and rapid calculations indicate that “employment” is 
mentioned approximately 18 times with “social” winning the Palm d’Or as it appears more than 
100 times. Certainly, in truth, it must be said  that this huge number of references is very much 
explained by the number of times the Economic and Social Committee is alluded to. Yet, the 
same can be said about the term “market”. In most instances, the reference is to the “common 
                                                 
28 Susan George, “France’s “non” marks just the beginning of our campaign”, op. cit., p. 50. 
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market”, not to the market economy. More depressingly, the dispute about of how many times the 
words “market” and “competition” appear in the Constitutional Treaty has revealed the depth of 
popular misunderstanding regarding the missions conferred on the EU, strictly speaking the EC, 
and a common and distressing ignorance about the purpose of competition rules.  
 
(1) A Common Market  
 
20. To clarify first the term common market, it must be pointed out that the EU was created with 
the goal of constantly improving, according to the preamble of the Treaty of Rome, “the living 
and working conditions of their peoples”. To do so, the Member States have recognised the need 
to remove trade barriers and accordingly granted European institutions with the necessary 
competences to supervise this  removal. It certainly cannot be denied that for a long time, the core 
of European activities were of economic nature, hence the formal name European Economic 
Community (EEC) used until 1992.29 The primary objective of the EU was and still is to 
complete market integration. In other words, since the origin, the goal of creating a “common 
market” lies at the heart of European integration as Article 2 TEC makes so clear.30  
21. What does the notion more precisely encompass? When the Member States established the 
EEC, they agreed to create a market where all impediments to free movement of goods, persons, 
services and capital among themselves are removed and where a common external policy would 
govern trade with non-Member States. The underlying assumption is that there are huge 
economic benefits associated with the fact of operating in a wider and open market.31 Most 
economic textbooks contend that the free movement of goods, workers, services and capital – the 
                                                 
29 Following the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty, the EEC was renamed the European Community (EC).  
30 Articles 3 TEC gives flesh to this goal by detailing further the ensuing activities of the Community: “1. For the 
purposes set out in Article 2, the activities of the Community shall include, as provided in this Treaty and in 
accordance with the timetable set out therein: 
(a) the prohibition, as between Member States, of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and 
export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect; 
(b) a common commercial policy; 
(c) an internal market characterised by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of 
goods, persons, services and capital;  
… 
(g) a system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted; …” 
31 See in particular P. Cecchini, The European Challenge 1992: The Benefits of a Single Market (Aldershot, 
Wildwood House, 1988) 
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so-called “four freedoms” in EU context – maximize wealth-creation. In simple terms, the setting 
up of a common market increases potential sales for each company. Furthermore, an increase in 
competition leads to more investment to maintain competitiveness, and the bigger dimension of 
the market leads to economies of scale. In theory, the result is more economic growth and 
therefore, more jobs. In their quest for such positive results, European institutions have always 
been mostly preoccupied with making sure that all barriers to European trade are removed. As the  
European Court of Justice put it, a common market is aimed at – the negative feature of the 
enterprise should be noted – eliminating “all obstacles to intra-community trade in order to merge 
the national markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those 
of a genuine internal market”.32 The signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 illustrated the 
willingness of a majority of Member States to refine the common market goal by establishing an 
economic and monetary union. As a result, a single currency now governs the trade of twelve 
Member States and all Member States must conduct their economic policies with a view to 
contributing to the achievement of the objectives of the Community.  
22. To recapitulate, the idea of a common market is inherently liberal and inevitably, of an 
economic nature. This may come as a shock to some. Yet, all democracies are “liberal” regimes 
functioning with an open market economy. As for the EU’s concern with economic matters, it is 
the result of Member States’ continuing choice and of their persistent refusal to transform the EU 
into some sort of state with a general competence over redistributive policies. Nevertheless, it 
would be incorrect to assume that European integration has no social dimension or that the goal 
of establishing a common market trumps everything else. In fact, in 1957, the EC Treaty included 
a Chapter on social provisions. The European Social Fund was further set up in 1958, in 
accordance with Article 146 TEC, with the mission of supporting measures which aim to prevent 
and combat unemployment, develop human resources and foster social integration in the labour 
market, in particular with regard to the disadvantaged sections of the population. To further 
contribute to the social and economic cohesion of the EU and create “a level playing field” 
                                                 
32 Case 15/81 Gaston Schul [1982] ECR 1409, para. 33. 
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following the liberalisation of intra-EU trade, a European Regional Development Fund later 
provided support mainly for public and private investments in infrastructure.33  
23. Ireland is a witness to European generosity and the importance of such policies in helping a 
national economy making the transition from a status of relatively low level of economic 
development to a high and sustainable level. To mention a few figures, during the period 1989-
2001, Ireland received €12.4bn in structural funds from Brussels. This is the equivalent to 1.9 per 
cent of annual gross national product.34 Even though European structural funds did not guarantee 
economic success, EC membership as well as EC financial grants must certainly be considered as 
decisive factors behind the emergence of the Celtic Tiger. This demonstrates that European 
integration is and ought to be based on solidarity between poor and rich Member States.  
24. Worker’s rights have also figured prominently in Community’s work since its origin. On the 
basis of the Treaty, extensive European legislation has been issued to guarantee that any national 
of a Member State is entitled to take up and engage in gainful employment on the territory of 
another Member State. Discrimination on the grounds of nationality is strictly prohibited. 
Furthermore, non-national workers are entitled to the same social and tax benefits as national 
workers. One may also mention that the Treaty of Rome itself, in 1957, provided for the principle 
of equality between men and woman, which means in particular that they should receive equal 
pay for equal work. One final element worth noting, thanks to an amendment introduced by the 
Amsterdam Treaty, the EC Treaty now requires the objectives of the Community’s social policy 
to be consonant with the fundamental social rights set out in the European Social Charter 1961 
and the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers 1989.35 
25. Irrespective of these Treaty provisions and European policies, it is nonetheless legitimate to 
consider that the social dimension of the EU has long remained the focus of less interest than the 
economic dimension of European integration. The Amsterdam Treaty reflects, however, a clear 
shift of emphasis. Particularly symbolic was the introduction of a new Article 13 TEC which 
refers to the adoption of provisions on non-discrimination, and authorises the Council, acting 
unanimously, “to take appropriate action to combat any discrimination based on sex, race, ethnic 
                                                 
33 Article 160 TEC: “The European Regional Development Fund is intended to help to redress the main regional 
imbalances in the Community through participation in the development and structural adjustment of regions whose 
development is lagging behind and in the conversion of declining industrial regions.” 
34 “Ireland proves to be a shining example of membership”, The Financial Times, April 22, 2004. 
35 See Article 136 TEC. 
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origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation.” The principle of equality between 
men and women was also added to the list of Community objectives. It is now explicitly provided 
that in all its activities the Community must aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality 
between men and women. 36 Among the other innovations introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, 
and to specifically answer French concerns, a new Title VIII on “Employment” was inserted into 
the EC Treaty. Accordingly, employment policies of the Member States ought to be coordinated 
with a view of mixing better “economic” and “social” policies in order to achieve full 
employment. The objective is to reach a “high level of employment”. In order to attain this 
objective, the Community is given a new area of responsibility to complement the activities of 
the Member States, involving the development of a “coordinated strategy” for employment. 
Again, to answer French concerns, a new Article 16 TEC was also introduced to protect “public 
services”. As the issue will be addressed in more detail infra, it is enough to mention here that 
“services of general economic interest”, the EU name for “public services”, see their role 
recognised in promoting social and territorial cohesion. 37 Consequently, the Member States 
agreed to state that “the Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers 
and within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services operate on the 
basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfil their missions.”38 
26. Now that it is clear that the EU had always had a strong social component, another contention 
needs to be answered. For left-leaning critics, the EU’s neo- liberal bias is clearly demonstrated 
by the fact that EU rules allow the common market goal to trump any other competing (social) 
objective. This is to forget that several provisions of the EC Treaty authorise the Member State to 
take national measures restraining the free movement of goods, persons, services or capital.39 In 
practice, if national measures severely restraining free trade (e.g. a ban on imports) serve the 
public interest, in other words, if they can be justified in the name of public morality, public 
security, protection of health, etc., and if they are proportionate and do not constitute a means of 
disguised discrimination, they will not be prohibited by EU law. The European Court of Justice 
has also developed a list of further justifications in situations where a Member State limits intra-
                                                 
36 See Article 3(2) TEC. 
37 Article II-96. 
38 Article III-122. 
39 Articles 39(3), 46 and 55 TEC allow Member States to derogate respectively from the principle of free movement 
of workers, from the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide and receive services. Article 58 TEC does 
the same regarding the principle of free movement of capital and payments. 
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EU trade in goods by imposing non-discriminatory rules which have an adverse impact on goods 
coming from other Member States. In other words, consumer protection, the protection of the 
environment, the pluralism of the press, etc., may justify national restrictions on European trade.  
27. A recent case, Schmidberger,40 shows, for instance, that the protection of fundamental rights 
should normally override free movement concerns. In this case, the Austrian authorities had 
closed the Brenner motorway for four days in order to allow an environmental group to organise 
a demonstration. Because the Brenner motorway is the major transit route for trade between 
Northern Europe and Italy, its closure led to a serious restriction on the free flow of goods 
between Member States with severe economic consequences for transport companies. The 
Austrian authorities had therefore to demonstrate that their action was justified under EC law. For 
the European Court of Justice, the protection of fundamental rights is a legitimate public interest 
which, in principle, justifies a restriction of the obligations imposed by EC law. In light of the 
facts of the case, the European Court of Justice ruled that a fair balance had been struck between 
the competing interests, i.e. the free movement of goods and freedom of assembly.  
28. It may still surprise some that fundamental rights constitutionally protected at the national 
level ought to be balanced against the free movement of goods. Certainly, it is a constitutional 
imperative for Member States to protect fundamental rights. Yet, as always, the European Court 
of Justice must also make sure, in light of the facts of each particular case, that restrictions on 
free movement rights guaranteed by EC law are not disproportionate to the legitimate objective 
pursued by the relevant Member State. If not, it would always be tempting for national authorities 
or private parties to hide protectionist intent behind the legitimate objective of protecting 
fundamental rights as protected under national constitutions. There should therefore be no 
indignation towards the idea of balancing fundamental rights with competing interests such as the 
free movement of goods or the free movement of people. What matters is that the European Court 
of Justice plainly and obviously accepts that the necessity to respect national fundamental rights 
may justify restrictions on the application of EU rules. 
29. More problematic than the content of the current Treaties or the overall direction of the case 
law is the vocabulary used at the European level. Indeed, it may create unnecessary scepticism 
about the ideological orientation of the EU. The so-called “four freedoms” – the free movement 
                                                 
40 See Case C-112/00 [2003].  
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of goods, persons, services or capital –  are also commonly described as the “fundamental 
freedoms” of the EC Treaty, 41 hence creating, and quite legitimately so, some unease as it easily 
leads uninformed citizens to believe that these four freedoms should therefore override any 
competing public interest. This vocabulary undeniably favours the advocates of the neo- liberal 
bias as it requires time and effort to make sense of EC law. Accordingly, advocates of the neo-
liberal thesis have an easy time arguing that the principle of free movement is merely a ruse to 
trump the real “fundamental freedoms”, meaning human rights. A bit of explanation about the 
terminology may therefore be useful. It is quite common for lawyers, in Germany or in France, to 
characterise human rights protected by the national constitution as “fundamental rights”, a term 
that includes rights (e.g. right to privacy) as well as freedoms (e.g. freedom of expression) 
without any distinction between the two. To call therefore the free movement of goods, persons, 
services or capital, “fundamental freedoms”, is unfortunate as it instinctively implies, for the 
citizens of some Member States at least, that the Community’s four freedoms can claim equal 
status with the human rights that are constitutionally protected. This is difficult to accept as 
respect for human rights is considered, politically speaking, the supreme value of any modern 
democratic system. 42 For that reason, it would be beneficial to eventually find a substitute to the 
use of the term “fundamental freedom” to describe the Community’s “four freedoms”. While the 
free movement  of capital may be a key principle in the establishment of a common market, to call 
it a “fundamental freedom” increases confusion amongst citizens. For an entity that does not 
suffer from excessive love, a change of vocabulary may be worth thinking of.  
30. As previously mentioned, in light of its progressive development over the years, the Member 
States rightly decided in 1992 it was time to rename the European Economic Community to the 
European Community, to do justice to its transformation into an entity no longuer predominantly 
concerned with the establishment of a common market. Indeed, among the policy areas where the 
EC may intervene, one may particularly signal the infamous area of agriculture but also asylum 
and immigration, transport, employment, trade, social welfare, consumer protection, research and 
technology, the environment and development aid. Furthermore, the EU was also invented to 
                                                 
41 This is actually what the Constitutional Treaty codifies. Under the title “fundamental freedoms”, Article I-4(1) 
provides that “the free movement of persons, services, goods and capital, and freedom of establishment shall be 
guaranteed within and by the Union, in accordance with the Constitution.” 
42 For instance, the German Constitution stipulates that human rights form the basis of every human community 
(Article 1(2)) and the preamble of the French Constitution proclaims the French people’s attachment to the Rights of 
Man as defined by the Declaration of 1789. 
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incorporate the EC and the policies and forms of intergovernmental cooperation established 
outside it, i.e. the Common Foreign and Security Policy and Justice and Home Affairs pillars. 
The current Treaties cannot therefore be presented as embodying a framework with an exclusive 
economic dimension. And when it is stated that the EU’s task is to create an area without internal 
frontiers, it is immediately followed by a provision emphasising the EU’s duty to promote a high 
level of employment and of social protection, equality between men and women, a high level of 
protection and improvement of the quality of the environment, the raising of the standard of 
living and quality of life, and economic and social cohesion and solidarity among Member States. 
To denounce the current Treaties, or the Constitutional Treaty for that matter, as a “liberal 
corset”, to repeat the daring analogy used by a French politician, 43 requires a good amount of bad 
faith. In the same way, the brawl about the reference to free and undistorted competition has 
revealed a worrying lack of knowledge.  
 
(b) Free and Undistorted Competition 
 
31. Surprisingly, many have labelled the European Constitutional Treaty a neo- liberal document 
on the grounds that it includes a commitment to offer European citizens “a single market where 
competition is free and undistorted.”44 While citizens can be forgiven for not knowing that this 
commitment has been in place since the signature of EC Treaty in 1957, nearly five decades ago, 
it is a depressing spectacle to see major politicians make loud protests about it even though, in 
some cases, they previously signed European treaties where the principle of free competition was 
obviously included. In any case, the principle of free and undistorted competition is a condition 
sine qua non for a European common market. There is no point removing barriers to trade if 
companies can subsequently allocate markets to each other on a national basis and 
compartmentalise markets according to national boundaries. Identically, national public 
authorities have to be submitted to the scrutiny of an impartial and supranational referee to make 
sure they will not subsidize inefficient national companies with the result of eliminating more 
efficient ones from other Member States. And it is precisely because each Member State is fully 
                                                 
43 See Jean-Pierre Chevènement quoted by Jean-Louis Andreani and Thomas Ferenczi, “Les six thèmes-clés de la 
campagne”, Le Monde, May 28, 2005. 
44 Article I-3(2). 
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aware of the imperative necessity of having an impartial actor to check that all the parties are 
playing by the rules, that the European Commission was instituted. Viewed in this light, it may be 
easier to understand why the EC Treaty has always provided that the Community shall have “a 
system ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted”45 and why the 
enforcement of European competition law has been entrusted to the Commission.46 As for the 
“constitutional” entrenchment of free competition, most French politicians have shown a singular 
lack of knowledge about their own law. Indeed, the French Constitutional Council also protects 
economic freedoms (freedom of movement and free competition) and in particular, it has given 
constitutional value to freedom of enterprise. Accordingly, it is not uncommon for French 
constitutional judges to balance freedom of enterprise with competing constitutional principles or 
rights, especially socio-economic rights. 
32. Regardless of the constitutional entrenchment of the principle of free competition in most 
Member States, it may still be argued that such a principle should not be entertained. Indeed, 
according to many left- leaning critics in France, Ireland and elsewhere, the Constitutional Treaty 
opens the door to “untamed competition” (concurrence sauvage). The following excerpt is 
archetypical of this tendency:  
“European politicians and commentators often speak (admiringly or accusingly) of Europe’s supposed 
“social model”. But the reality … is that right-wing (or neo-liberal) economic policies are now dominant at 
EU level. This is evident in, among other things, an EU competition policy that can act against state 
provision of certain goods and services. As part of competition policy, the EU limits state aid to businesses 
(though there are certain egregious exceptions, such as the Common Agricultural Policy).”47 
It is therefore necessary to ask whether or not the pursuit of free competition may contradict a 
genuine respect of the social goals listed in other provisions of the Constitutional Treaty or in the 
current rules governing the EU. To answer the question, the main rationale behind competition 
policy must be understood – the promotion of economic efficiency or, as the economists would 
say, the optimum allocation of resources. The underlying assumption of competition law in all 
democracies is that there are economic benefits associated with a market economy organised on a 
                                                 
45 Article 3(g) TEC. 
46 The power to enforce EC competition law on anti-competitive restrictions between undertakings and on abuses of 
a dominant position is shared with the Member State competition authorities and national courts by virtue of 
Regulation 1/2003. In other areas of competition law, it lies exclusively with the Commission (merger control when 
the merger has a Community dimension and monitoring of State aid). 
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competitive basis: competition favours innovation, reduces production costs and assures the 
consumer desired goods at the lowest price and the best quality possible, with the sacrifice of the 
fewest resources. It would be foolish to deny that the law protecting free competition has a direct 
role in the prosperity of our democratic societies. Similarly, it is difficult to understand why some 
see competition rules as a neo- liberal plot. In fact, it is because the practical functioning of the 
market economy is to some extent deficient that competition rules are required. Apparently, this 
is a point that left-wing critics of the Constitutional Treaty have a hard time understanding. If the 
market could function in a situation of perfect competition, 48 no external referee would be 
needed. However, because the market does not function perfectly in real life – the number of 
buyers or sellers is often reduced, information about products and services is never complete, 
barriers to entry into a specific market often exist, etc. – national public authorities must 
intervene to make sure that firms and also local authorities, play by the rules of the game. In other 
words, competition rules are there to regulate the functioning of the market, not to promote 
“untamed competition”.  
33. To “attack” the constitutional text on the ground that it includes provisions aimed at ensuring 
competition serves to illustrate a rudimentary knowledge of the functioning of a modern 
economy.49 If critics were consistent, they should then formulate an alternative to an economy 
governed by competition under a regulatory framework defined by public authorities. Too often, 
criticism aimed at the “neo- liberal Europe” often masks affection for discredited economic 
philosophies and systems. And, as a matter of fact, the Constitutional Treaty merely reproduces 
the current provisions of the Treaty of Rome.50 Briefly exposed, European competition law 
forbids agreements between firms which restrict competition (e.g. price-fixing agreements 
between competitors) and abuses of a dominant position (e.g. when a dominant firm exploits 
consumers or tries to annihilate competition through illegal behaviour). The European 
Commission has also the power to control mergers between firms to avoid any excessive 
                                                 
48 “Perfect competition” is usually broadly defined as a market structure in which they are large numbers of both 
buyers and sellers, homogeneous products, perfect information about the price of each firm’s product and no barriers 
to market entry. 
49 See generally the website of the Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens 
(ATTAC: www.attac.org) for an immense panoply of arguments mainly emphasising the fact that the European 
Union should not based on the principle of free trade and free competition but rather on a principle of “cooperation” 
between the Member States. In this author’s opinion, although the extent and modes of implementation of free trade 
and free competition may legitimately be debated, the apparent desire to re-apply the economic doctrine of the 
defunct USSR is rather troubling. 
50 See Articles 81-87 TEC. 
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domination of a particular market. State aid is also monitored in order to make sure no Member 
State uses public funds to favour national firms or artificially keep a loss-making national firm in 
business even though there may be no real prospect of recovery. Finally, regardless of the debate 
surrounding the Constitutional Treaty, it is important to identify who are the beneficiaries of a 
free and undistorted competition. Contrary to what is propagated by the self-proclaimed 
defenders of the weak and poor against the allegedly EU’s “neo- liberal” policies, rather than big 
“evil” firms, citizens and small and medium-sized firms are the direct beneficiaries of 
competition rules. In the words of Mario Monti, the former European Commissioner in charge of 
competition policy:  
“The competition policy pursued by the European Commission has a direct impact on the daily life of the 
citizens of the EU. The reduction of telephone charges, wider access to air transport and the possibility of 
buying a car in the EU country in which prices are lowest are tangible results. … Whether they be 
consumers, savers, users of public services, employees or taxpayers, the Union’s citizens enjoy the fruits of 
the competition policy in the various aspects of their everyday life.”51 
34. A few examples suffice to prove Mr. Monti right, in particular the European Commission 
decision against Microsoft issued in 2004.52 After a long investigation and despite a huge team of 
well-paid lawyers employed by Microsoft, the Commission fined Microsoft €497 million, the 
biggest fine ever levied by the Commission, for abusing its market power. Concretely speaking, 
Microsoft abused its dominant position by deliberately restricting the possibility of using its 
products with the products of other competitors and by tying its Windows Media Player with its 
ubiquitous Windows operating system. In short, thanks to its virtual monopoly in PC operating 
systems, as stated by the Commission, Microsoft had been illegally trying to shut competitors out 
of the market and to artificially alter consumer choice in favour of Microsoft’s products. It should 
be clear therefore that the direct beneficiaries of a strict enforcement of competition rules are 
certainly consumers and small and medium firms.  
35. French citizens may be about to realise that competition law is the only alternative to 
excessive private power in the context of the so-called “Yalta of the mobile phone”. It recently 
transpired that the three dominant companies of the sector in France met monthly between 1997 
                                                 
51 European Commission, Competition Policy in Europe and the Citizen (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
Publications of the European Communities, 2000), p. 4. 
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and 2003 to fix prices and share market. Interestingly, and reminiscent of the worst aspect of 
Berlusconi’s Italy where public officials have been abusing their powers to protect personal and 
dodgy business interests, the French Finance Minister supervising the investigation in 2005 is the 
former president of France Telecom and therefore a direct actor behind this manifest illegal 
scheme. An additional comment must be made. It could very well be argued that no Member 
State on its own would have had the courage to stand against Microsoft for fear of economic 
retaliation, or could have resisted intense lobbying and financial contribution to governing 
political parties. Indeed, thanks to its political clout, Microsoft escaped condemna tion in the 
United States. In Europe, the independence of the European Commission has allowed a thorough 
investigation into well-known suspicious business practices.    
36. European rules on state aid must also be briefly explored as national politicians often 
deliberately misinterpret them. This time around, though, criticism mainly originates from the 
right-wing of the political spectrum. What is usually denounced is the interference of “Brussels” 
in what should be a “sovereign” definition of national industrial policy. More modestly, EC law 
forbids state aid that distorts intra-Community competition by favouring certain companies or the 
production of certain goods. The rationale behind such prohibition is straightforward.  By giving 
certain national companies or goods favoured treatment, a Member State unfairly discriminates 
against companies that operate unaided. Such a policy could lead to unemployment in other 
Member States where unaided companies may have to close down as they cannot compete with 
subsidized ones, irrespective of the fact that they may be more efficient. This, in turn, reduces the 
general competitiveness of Europe as a whole.53 Efficiency is not, however, the cardinal and 
unique value of the EU. Too often, the national media forget to mention that state aid can be 
considered acceptable when it has useful social purposes, when it contributes to the development 
of regions with low levels of development, when it encourages certain activities and practices that 
are of common interest or, without being exhaustive, when it seeks to remedy a serious 
disturbance in the economy of a Member State.54 European rules on state aid, therefore, cannot be 
presented as being of an absolutist nature. In practice, the great majority of aid schemes are 
                                                 
53 The stud fee tax exemption is a good example. The tax exemption has helped to make the Irish bloodstock industry 
the biggest in Europe. Not only do Irish taxpayers foot the bill for a cost of approximately of €3 million annually, it 
has helped decimate the bloodstock industry in other Member States where the sector had less political clout. See 
Mark Brennock, “EU Commission could demand an end to tax free stud fees”, The Irish Times , February 4, 2005.   
54 See Article 87(2) and (3) TEC.  
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indeed approved by the Commission. The hysteria surrounding the proposal to grant state aid to 
Intel’s operation in Ireland was beyond belief. 55 Not mentioning the following ridiculous 
withdrawal of the aid operated by the Irish Government before any formal inquiry by the 
European Commission, there was no authoritative voice to remind the public that giving 
taxpayer’s money (apparently between €50 and €100 million) to a highly profitable and dominant 
American giant firm was from the start a questionable choice. Worse, the purpose was not to 
create new jobs or support innovation but rather to respond to Intel’s threat to move its 
production out of the country, a despicable yet classic business move nowadays. Moreover, one 
could imagine the nationalistic screams if another Member State would pursue a similar strategy, 
leading to the closure of the Irish plant. To attract foreign investment, the Celtic Tiger already 
benefits from a low tax rate on business profits, a trait already denounced as unfair competition 
by some Member States.56 It is hard to see a pressing need to subsidize profitable businesses, if 
only to use public money to enrich private shareholders. More pragmatically, if it were not for the 
European Commission, Ireland would not be able to compete against bigger economies where the 
temptation to attract foreign investments may also easily lead to granting huge sums of public 
subsidies. Finally, while European (or national) competition rules may not be perfect, they are 
nonetheless indispensable tools to retain fa ir competition and prohibit distorting practises, 
detrimental to the public as a whole, from public authorities as well as private actors. 
37. To sum up, contrary to the fear vehemently expressed by many French citizens during the 
referendum campaign of 2005, competition rules are in reality protective of consumers and of 
taxpayers. It is the lack of competition rules or the lack of robust enforcement of such rules which 
actually leads to the “untamed competition”. There is, however, an argument which has yet to be 
explored. It is often argued that European competition rules are of an “absolutist” in nature, 
meaning that they override any competing public interest. As we shall see below, the European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice have always sought to balance efficiency 
concerns and competing goals, such as social objectives. To be sure, competition is only one 
policy among others, and the maintenance of competition ought to be read in light of the entire 
EC Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty for that matter. First remark, the notion of competition is 
understood pragmatically. According to the European Court of Justice, the EC Treaty is aimed at 
                                                 
55 Opinion, “New Realities of Investment Aid”, The Irish Times, March 3, 2005. 
56 For more details on taxation, see infra The “Race to the Bottom”.  
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achieving a “workable competition”, “that is to say the degree of competition necessary to ensure 
the observance of the basic requirements and attainment of the objectives of the Treaty”. 57 To put 
it differently, the objective is to attain sufficient competition in a real world where perfect 
competition is not achievable while taking into account other public interests. Accordingly, as we 
shall now see, European competition rules may be set aside in order for a Member State to fulfil 
social objectives.  
38. Left-leaning critics never mention that the European Court of Justice has recognised the 
“social” dimension of the common market, and the necessity to give this equal weight to the 
economic dimension of market integration. A few cases are worth mentioning to demonstrate the 
simplistic character of the neo- liberal bias thesis. In a case decided in 1999, Albany 
International,58 the European Court of Justice recognised the need to balance the social and 
economic objectives of the EC: 
“ [I]t is important to bear in mind that … the activities of the Community are to include not only a ‘system 
ensuring that competition in the internal market is not distorted’ but also ‘a policy in the social sphere’. 
Article 2 of the EC Treaty provides that a particular task of the Community is ‘to promote throughout the 
Community a harmonious and balanced development of economic activit ies’ and ‘a high level of 
employment and of social protection’.”59 
39. As a result, the Court held that agreements concluded in the context of collective negotiations 
between management and labour in pursuit of social policy objectives must, by virtue of their 
nature and purpose, not be subject to competition rules. In this particular case, it was therefore 
decided that a private employer cannot invoke competition rules to opt-out of a compulsory 
sectoral pension scheme drawn up by the social partners. As the agreement made a direct 
contribution to the improvement of work end employment conditions in the EU, this type of 
agreement cannot be evaluated in light of European competition law.  
40. Another case, Sievers,60 decided in 2000, can also help demonstrate that fundamental rights 
have primacy over the principle of free competition. Faced with a situation where part-time 
workers were excluded from a retirement pension scheme, the European Court of Justice recalled 
its Defrenne II ruling according to which the principle of equal pay for male and female workers, 
                                                 
57 Case 26/76 Metro  [1977] ECR 1875, para. 20. 
58 Case C-67/96 Albany International [1999] ECR I-5751. 
59 Ibid., para. 54. 
60 Case C-270/97 Sievers [2000] ECR I-929. 
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guaranteed at Article 141 TEC, pursues a twofold purpose, both economic and social. First, in 
view of the different stages of development of social legislation in the various Member States, the 
aim of the Treaty provision “is to avoid a situation in which undertakings established in States 
which have actually implemented the principle of equal pay suffer a competitive disadvantage in 
intra-Community competition as compared with undertakings established in States which have 
not yet eliminated discrimination against women workers as regards pay”.61 Secondly, the Court 
has stressed that the principle of equal pay for male and female workers “forms part of the social 
objectives of the Community, which is not merely an economic union [emphasis added] but is at 
the same time intended, by common action, to ensure social progress and seek constant 
improvement of the living and working conditions of the peoples of Europe, as is emphasised in 
the Preamble to the Treaty”.62 In light of these observations, the European Court of Justice 
concluded that the economic aim pursued by Article 141 is secondary to the social aim pursued 
by the same provision, namely the right not to be discriminated against on the ground of sex, 
which is a fundamental human right.63  
41. In other words, regarding the alleged absolutist application of competition rules, the case law 
of the European Court of Justice actually demonstrates the partiality of those denouncing the neo-
liberal predisposition of European institutions. The need to balance the goal of a single market 
where competition is free with a wide range of social objectives has been formally recognised by 
EU institutions.  
 
(3) The Situation with “Public Services”  
 
42. To further raise our case, the situation with “public services” should be examined. Indeed, 
due to a romanticised attachment to “public services” in countries such as France, a critique often 
heard is that the EU is eager to apply competition rules without paying due attention to the 
specificities of those services. The Constitutional Treaty has been therefore described as the last 
                                                 
61 Ibid., para. 54, referring to Case 43/75 “Defrenne II” [1976] ECR 455, para. 9.  
62 Ibid., para. 55, referring to “Defrenne II”, para. 10. 
63 Ibid., para. 57. Accordingly, for the European Court of Justice, part-time workers are entitled to retroactive 
membership of an occupational pension scheme and to receive a pension under that scheme, notwithstanding the risk 
of distortions of competition between economic operators of the various Member States to the detriment of 
employers established in the first Member State.  
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act before complete privatisation of what remains under public control at the national level. In the 
author’s view, and this is rarely advocated even by “neo-liberal” economists, it is clear that 
competition rules ought not to be applied to all sectors of a market economy. Indeed, it is obvious 
that a free market cannot provide all public goods or services a society may be in need of (e.g. 
defence, public infrastructure, etc.). A free market may also be unable to satisfy needs with 
limited or no solvency. In any case, the fact that the European Commission has been trying to 
liberalise some sector of activities has been constantly presented by left- leaning critics as a threat 
to the idea of “service public”.  
43. Even though the French like to claim paternity over the concept, all societies obviously 
operate a hierarchy between social activities and exclude some of these, from a market where 
competition is free and undistorted. Such policy choices are contingent and would vary according 
to the axiological preferences of each society. There may be, however, a public service à la 
française in the sense that this idea is also treated as a legal concept in France. In simple terms, it 
has been used by some legal scholars to identify the scope of French administrative law. The 
unfortunate aspect of the success of the term “service public” is that it tends to be confused with 
the idea of public monopoly and the exclusive use of administrative law. Also striking is the fact 
that most citizens associate “public services” with the exclusion of market mechanisms. To a 
great extent, this vision amounts to a myth entertained by the left. Indeed, legally speaking, 
numerous French “public services” had always been governed by private law by as early as the 
end of the 19th century. Similarly, it was common in the past, and it obviously is common today, 
to delegate the management of “public services” to private individuals and firms while imposing 
a certain number of specific obligations on them.   
44. Viewed in this light, the “threatening” neo-liberal record of EU law seems less compelling. 
Indeed, not only are European competition rules excluded where the relevant activities are not of 
an economic nature,64 what EU law essentially requires the reconciliation of market mechanisms 
with “commercial” public services, i.e. energy, telecommunication, transport, postal services, 
etc., not to bring the idea of public services to an end. Hence, EU law plainly accepts that 
                                                 
64 For instance, when the activities of a public (or private for that matter) entity, by their nature, their aim and the 
rules to which they are subject, are connected with the exercise of powers which are typically those of a public 
authority, European competition rules cannot be applied. See e.g. Case C-364/92, Eurocontrol [1994] ECR I-43. The 
situation is identical for organisations involved in the management of the public social security system, which fulfil 
an exclusively social function and perform an activity based on the principle of national solidarity which is entirely 
non-profit-making. See e.g. Case C-159/91, Poucet [1993] ECR I-637. 
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national public authorities and European institutions may have to restrain the work of market 
forces. However, they ought to justify the extent to which they do so regarding commercial 
activities “which the public authorities class as being of general interest and subject to specific 
public services obligations”. 65 Ultimately, what is essential is that activities of an economic 
nature, which may be said to be “of general interest”, are obliged by public authorities to comply 
with specific public-service obligations such as universality and equality of access, continuity, 
affordability, etc. Public ownership and/or the grant of a monopoly should not be seen as being 
inherent to the idea of “public service” or in Eurospeak, of “services of general economic 
interest”. Indeed, in commercial sectors, rather than directly acting as service providers, public 
authorities should pursue the more effective option to impose on the competing private entities 
common public-service obligations to guarantee access for all, whatever the economic, social or 
geographical situation, to a service of a specified quality at an affordable price. Accordingly, 
rather than excluding the implementation of competition rules to sectors of an economic nature, 
the objective should be to strike the right balance between public service missions and the 
operation of market mechanisms, with a view of promoting Europe’s general interest.  
45. This conclusion can easily be deduced from Treaty Articles and the case law of the European 
Court of Justice. Article 16 TEC, introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, deals precisely with 
“services of general economic interest”, the EU name for “public services”, and provides that 
“the Community and the Member States, each within their respective powers and 
within the scope of application of this Treaty, shall take care that such services 
operate on the basis of principles and conditions which enable them to fulfil their 
missions.” This somewhat tortuous formulation might be considered insufficiently protective. 
Yet, Article 86(2) TEC further reserves the situation of those firms entrusted with the operation 
of services of general economic interest. The application of competition rules should not 
“obstruct the performance, in law or in fact, of the particular tasks assigned to them.” True, the 
same Article sets a condition: “the development of trade must not be affected to such an extent as 
would be contrary to the interests of the Community”. This should not lead to excessive worry. 
Indeed, this condition has a marginal importance since the Commission had never successfully 
relied on it before the European Court of Justice. More fundamentally, the European Court of 
                                                 
65 Commission Green Paper of 21 May 2003 on services of general interest, COM(2003) 270 final, para. 16, OJ C 76 
of 25 March 2004. 
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Justice interprets Article 86(2) in a manner that authorises public authorities to temper market 
forces in all commercial sectors to the extent it is necessary to fulfil “universal service” 
obligations, obligations that are not in themselves profitable.66  
46. Generally speaking, for the European Court of Justice, competition rules can be set aside if 
their implementation will obstruct the performance of the special obligations incumbent upon the 
undertaking entrusted with the management of services of general economic interest, under 
economically acceptable conditions.67 Finally, the European Court of Justice defines the notion of 
“universal service” in line with the French tradition. In other words, a common set of obligations 
governs any undertaking entrusted with the management of a public service. In particular, the 
public service should be made available at a specified quality to all consumers and users 
throughout the territory of a Member State, independently of geographical location, and, in the 
light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price.68  
47. And contrary to what the defenders of public services à la française have been arguing over 
and over, the Constitutional Treaty strengthens the importance of services of general interest as 
one of the pillars of the European model of society and the need to ensure the provision of high-
quality and affordable services of general interest to all citizens and enterprises in the EU. For 
instance, access to services of general economic interest, “as provided for in national laws and 
practices” and in accordance with the current Treaty rules, becomes a new fundamental right 
under Article II-96 of the Constitutional Treaty. The aim, reflecting the current content of Article 
16 TEC, is to promote the social and territorial cohesion of the Union. As for the further details 
set out in Article III-122 of the Constitutional Treaty, even though the provision could have been 
more clearly formulated, the Member States agreed to underline the national competence for the 
provision of public services and the possibility for each Member State “to provide, to commission 
and to fund such services” is guaranteed. At the end of the day, the denigration of the EU on the 
ground that it supposedly condemns public services is another example of serious prejudice.  
                                                 
66 The concept of universal service refers to a set of general interest requirements ensuring that certain services are 
made available at a specified quality to all consumers and users throughout the territory of a Member State, 
independently of geographical location, and, in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price. It has 
been developed specifically for some of the network industries (e.g. telecommunications, electricity, and postal 
services). See Article 3(1) of Directive 2002/22/EC of 7 March 2002 on universal service and users’ rights relating to 
electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ L 108/51, April 24, 2002. 
67 See e.g. Case C-159/94 Commission v. France [1997] ECR I-5815. 
68 See e.g. Case C-393/92 Almelo [1994] ECR I-1477. 
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48. To conclude on the neo- liberal thesis, neither the current Treaties nor the Constitutional 
Treaty can be seriously identified as instruments of “ultra- liberalism”. When examined in their 
details, the evidence put forward by left-leaning critics reveal astonishing incoherence. Indeed, in 
most cases, they seem not to realise that they are actually denouncing principles at the foundation 
of the EU since the signature of the Treaty of Rome in 1957, for instance, the principle of a free 
and undistorted competition, without understanding its rationale and without linking it to the fact 
that one essential purpose of the EU was to complete and to guarantee the proper functioning of a 
common market. The economic dimension of European integration is merely the direct 
expression of the limited missions conferred on the EU by the Member States, and certainly not 
the fruit of some mysterious neo-liberal conspiracy.  
49. Amusingly, in a popular book,69 it has been argued, on the contrary, that “behind the formal 
rules which govern the decision-making process of the European Union, the French have 
imposed their will to an extraordinary extent.” Accordingly, for some, the EU resembles a 
socialist Leviathan in the image of the French State while for other critics, it embodies a neo-
liberal experiment. Irrespective of the ridiculous nature of both accusations, it has to be said that 
the constitutional text certainly offers some “progress” or, to put it more neutrally, change, in 
terms of Union’s values and objectives. If it is ever ratified, the EU will then be expressly 
founded on the values of equality and solidarity. Among many others “social” provisions, one 
may note that the Constitutional Treaty expressly stipulates that the EU shall combat social 
exclusion and shall promote social justice. Clearly, this amounts to a restatement, yet in a clearer 
and concise manner, of the current values and objectives of the Union. These values and 
objectives could hardly belong to a purportedly neo- liberal entity.  
50. The fact that the Constitutional Treaty has suffered the criticism of free-marketers as well as 
neo-Marxists may amount to the ultimate evidence that it offers a balanced framework. In reality, 
it would be easier to understand the argument that the constitutional text will make Europe more 
“socialist” as it authorises a better inclusion of social goals. Indeed, in one innovative move, the 
drafters of the Constitutional Treaty have included the so-called “consistency clause” according 
to which the EU must ensure consistency between the entire set of European policies and 
activities, taking all of its objectives into account.70 Among these objectives, as previously 
                                                 
69 Larry Siedentop, Democracy in Europe (London, Penguin, 2000), p. 30. 
70 See Article III-115. 
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exposed, any reader will discover an exhaustive series of social and societal objectives. If this 
new clause is not enough, a general “social clause” is also included to oblige the EU, when 
defining and implementing all of its policies, to take into account the promotion of a high level of 
employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection, the fight against social exclusion, etc.71 
Also of significant importance is the incorporation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights into 
the Constitutional Treaty, with its exhaustive list of socio-economic rights. This can hardly 
exemplify the neo- liberal “dream house” that some left-leaning critics have depicted. Indeed, as 
formulated by the working group of the European Convention on Social Europe:  
“European policy in the economic and social sphere is aimed at creating conditions for the fullest 
development of the individual in society in such a manner that ultimately the free development of each one 
becomes a condition for the free development of all.”72  
Therefore, to accuse the EU of being a neo- liberal entity completely betrays the past and current 
efforts of balancing the economic and social dimension of European integration and further 
illustrates a profound miscomprehension of the limited mandate of the EU. Rather than agreeing 
to the creation of a European welfare state, the democratically elected representatives of the 
Member States have agreed to push for the completion of an interna l market. The former goal 
may be legitimately entertained, yet political fiction is not the concern of the present study.  
51. If the Constitutional Treaty cannot be seriously described as a neo- liberal instrument, it 
cannot be denied that the neo- liberal charge found a special resonance in the hearts and minds of 
many French voters. Unfortunately but expectedly, the Constitutional Treaty has also served as a 
red herring to contest alleged social or fiscal dumping. In short, this time, it is not the content of 
the legal provisions governing the EU that is condemned but rather the substance of public 
policies defined at Union level. The reality of a European-organised “race to the bottom” must 
hence be examined. In this instance, the arguments raised against European integration appear 
prima facie much more substantiated.  
                                                 
71 See Article III-117. 
72 The European Convention, Final Report of Working Group XI on “Social Europe”, CONV 516/1/03, Brussels, 
February 4, 2003, p. 29. 
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II. – The Race to the Bottom  
 
52. While it has been common to denounce “Brussels” for its neo- liberal policies, widespread 
fears of social dumping and outsourcing were somewhat unanticipated by the proponents of the 
Constitutional Treaty. It is now clear however that allegations of social dumping and outsourcing 
has found deep resonance in France. It was somewhat nonetheless unsurprising as the social 
dumping charge had been asserted for years by an influential association of “alter-globalizers” in 
its fights against the World Trade Organisation. 73 It may well be described as the most effective 
allegation raised against the Constitutional Treaty. It would be excessive, however, to condemn 
the EU on the grounds that it organises social dumping or to use another popular expression, a 
race to the bottom leading to the dismantlement of the welfare state and the watering down of 
social standards.  
53. The picture is, unfortunately, more complex. While it can be affirmed that European 
integration has created general constraints on national policy choices, the genuine threat to the 
preservation of European welfare states seems rather to predominantly derive from structural and 
national problems (e.g. unfavourable demographic trends, massive unemployment, etc.). And the 
pressure to reform the welfare state generally originates from national groups unwilling to 
continue to pay high taxes for preserving existing levels of welfare protection. As for watering 
down social standards, it is difficult to find a binding piece of European legislation harmonising 
social standards at the lowest common denominator. This is not to categorically refute that 
European rules on free movement of goods, persons, services and capital might favour 
“regulatory competition” between the Member States and indirectly add downward pressure on 
workers’ salaries. To precisely prove that this regulatory competition actually leads to a race to 
the bottom in Europe remains, however, an arduous challenge. We shall try to demonstrate this 
point in light of the heated debate surrounding European-wide harmonisation of taxation and the 
recent “Bolkestein” proposal emanating from the European Commission and aimed at liberalising 
services throughout Europe. 
 
(1) The Reality of Regulatory Competition between the Member States  
                                                 
73 See www.attac.org. 
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54. Before examining the EU’s responsibility, if any, in organising a “race to the bottom”, the 
expression must be put into context. The classic diagnosis is usually formulated as follows: the 
completion of the European common market and the development of economic globalisation 
have led to a “regulatory competition” between Member States leading, in turn, to a “race to the 
bottom”.  
 
(a) The European Dimension of the “Delaware Effect” 
 
55. This is hardly an entirely new problem. Indeed, it is common in the United States to discuss 
the so-called “Delaware effect”. 74 In short, critics of Delaware’s corporate laws have argued that 
most large American firms establish themselves in this US State simply because its rules are the 
least demanding. Evoking this problem of companies establishing in states where the cost was 
lowest and the laws least restrictive, Justice Brandeis spoke in 1933 of a “race” between US 
states which “was one not of diligence but of laxity”. 75 
56. To recapitulate the origin of the current situation, it is necessary to return to the “stagflation” 
crisis of the seventies. Following the huge increases in oil prices in the seventies and the 
implosion of the Bretton Woods regime of fixed exchange rates, all major industrialised nations 
suffered inflation and unemployment. To deal with the economic crisis, the liberalisation of trade 
and free movement of capital have been promoted. Generally speaking, the influence of 
economic liberalism has greatly benefited from from the demise of communism and the apparent 
failure of classic Keynesian remedies, i.e. the stimulation of the economy through expansionary 
fiscal policy or monetary policy. In accordance with the liberal mantra, most nation states have 
since then voluntarily given up their individual capacity to control capital transfers, trade in 
goods and services, etc., and hence the development of a globalised economy. Parallel to this 
trend, the establishment of a common market in Europe has obliged the Member States of the EU 
to abolish obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital.  
                                                 
74 For a recent look at the relevance of the question whether or not state-to-state competitive pressures on Delaware 
make for a race to the top or to the bottom, see Mark Roe, “Delaware’s Competition” (2003) 117 Harvard Law 
Review 590. 
75 Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, at 559. 
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57. These developments, it is often alleged, threaten the viability of the welfare state as well as 
high social standards. In simple terms, the argument goes that in an environment where free 
trade, free competition and free movement of the factors of production are all promoted and, in 
the case of the EU, legally guaranteed over national laws, national authorities have no choice but 
to offer national firms, capital owners or highly skilled workers, the best regulatory environment, 
some would say the least constraining one, to retain them and eventually attract foreign firms, 
capital and workers. This process is known as regulatory competition. 76 Although the process can 
be positively defended from a theoretical point of view, 77 it has been forcefully argued by Fritz 
Scharpf, in his classic book Governing in Europe, that regulatory competition is not without 
damaging consequences from a social point of view:  
“As all countries are now competing to attract or retain investment capital and producing firms, all are 
trying to reduce the regulatory and tax burdens on capital and firms, and all are tempted to reduce the claims 
of those groups – the young, the sick, the unemployed, and the old – that most depend on public services 
and welfare transfers.”78  
58. If you add the temptation for national governments, in the name of retaining competitiveness, 
to make the labour market more “flexible” by lowering, for instance, workers’ legal protection 
against dismissal, this is exactly the race to the bottom most European citizens instinctively fear. 
And indeed, it is widely believed today, at least by the citizenry of some Member States in the 
“old Europe” that regulatory competition is progressively leading to a situation where Member 
States compete on the basis of low standards. The recent enlargement contributed decisively to 
the diffusion of this view. 
59. To solely focus on the European dimension of the problem, critics contend that the EU 
inherently favours a race to the bottom by adding to the constraints on policy choices brought 
upon nation states by the liberalisation of trade under the auspices of the World Trade 
                                                 
76 Jeanne-Mey Sun and Jacques Pelkmans define it as follows: “Regulatory competition is the alteration of national 
regulation in response to the actual or expected impact of internationally mobile goods, services, or factors on 
national economic activity,” “Regulatory Competition in the Single Market” (1995) 33 Journal of Common Market 
Studies 67, at 68-69. 
77 Three justifications are normally given for regulatory competition: “firstly, it allows the content of rules to be 
matched more effectively to the preferences or wants of the consumers of laws (citizens and others affected); 
secondly, it promotes diversity and experimentation in the search for effective legal solutions; and thirdly, by 
providing mechanisms for preferences to be expressed and alternative solutions compared, it promotes the flow of 
information on effective law making”, Catherine Barnard and Simon Deakin, “Market Access and Regulatory 
Competition” in Catherine Barnard and Joanne Scott (ed), The Law of the Single European Market (Oxford, Hart, 
2002), p. 199.  
78 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic? (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 176. 
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Organisation. To understand the nature of Europe’s constraint, the common distinction between 
negative integration to positive integration must be understood. In short, negative integration is 
about removing barriers to trade by imposing prohibitions on the Member States in terms of the 
free movement of the factors of production. As previously mentioned, the European Court of 
Justice has always considered that the purpose of the Treaty provisions dealing with the “four 
freedoms” is to eliminate “all obstacles to intra-community trade in order to merge the national 
markets into a single market bringing about conditions as close as possible to those of a genuine 
internal market”. 79 By contrast, positive integration “refers to the reconstruction of a system of 
economic regulation at the level of the larger economic unit.”80 The argument runs that “the main 
beneficiary of supranational European law has been negative integration”. 81 Undeniably, the 
European Commission, in association with the European Court of Justice, has greatly favoured 
market integration by making sure that Member States do not infringe Treaty provisions 
prohibiting them from protecting domestic producers or from restricting the freedom of national 
firms and workers to move to another Member State. In doing so, it is correct to argue that the 
European Commission pushed for an extensive interpretation of the relevant Treaty provisions 
and that, in most cases, the European Court of Justice concurred.  
60. To appreciate the force of negative integration as a constraint on Member State’s regulatory 
autonomy, a succinct examination of the celebrated Cassis de Dijon case82 should be undertaken. 
Faced with a German law that prohibited selling fruit liqueur unless it contains a certain 
minimum amount of alcohol content, the European Court of Justice were easily convinced by the 
Commission that the German law served a protectionist intent rather than the defence of public 
interests such as the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the 
fairness of commercial transactions or the defence of the consumer:  
“It is clear … that the requirements relating to the minimum alcohol content of alcoholic beverages do not 
serve a purpose which is in the general interest and as such to take precedence over the requirements of the 
free movement of goods, which constitutes one of the fundamental rules of the Community.”83 
                                                 
79 Case 15/81 Gaston Schul [1982] ECR 1409, para. 33. 
80 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe, op. cit., p. 45. 
81 Ibid., p. 50. 
82 Case 120/78 [1979] ECR 649. 
83 Ibid., para. 14. One may note in particular the ludicrous argument raised by the German Government as regards the 
protection of public health. To defend its legislation, it argued that the purpose of fixing minimum alcohol content is 
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The case is remarkable less for the protection it afforded Cassis de Dijon – a splendid French 
liqueur – against German attempts at restricting its sale than for the European Court of Justice’s 
interpretation of Article 28 TEC. This Article forbids “quantitative restrictions on imports and all 
measures having equivalent effect” on imports between the Member States. By setting out the 
principle that this Treaty provision prohibits discriminatory national rules and also non-
discriminatory ones unless justified, the European Court of Justice granted itself control over the 
regulatory choices of the Member States. In other words, when an apparent “neutral” national 
trading rule, i.e. a non-discriminatory rule, has the effect of hindering intra-EU trade, the Member 
State must also justify its existence. As we shall see when the “Bolkestein” Directive on Services 
will be dealt with, the European Court of Justice has adopted a similar approach in the context of 
free movement of workers and services.  
61. The second remarkable aspect of this decision is that by further announcing the new principle 
of mutual recognition, i.e. the principle according to which products lawfully manufactured and 
marketed in one Member State must be admitted in all Member States, the European Court of 
Justice empowered the consumer and promoted market integration to the detriment of Member 
States’ autonomy to regulate trade in the absence of European harmonisation. To summarise, 
Cassis de Dijon opened the door to European scrutiny of all national regulations that can be 
viewed as obstacles to the free movement of goods between the Member States. In order to 
survive European scrutiny, national measures must be “reasonable”, meaning they must be 
justified by the defence of a public interest and must be proportionate in their scope.  
62. Clearly, it is up to the European Court of Justice to ultimately define not only what should be 
viewed as an obstacle to free trade and once an obstacle is determined, to accept or not a Member 
State’s defence of it. True to what its critics often assert, the European Court of Justice showed 
some dogmatism in this exercise. First, it has broadly interpreted the remit of Article 28 TEC. 
Second, it has frequently adjudicated in favour of market integration rather than in favour of the 
societal goals raised by the Member States. However, since the beginning of the nineties, its case 
law illustrates more judicial self-restraint and the readiness of the European Court of Justice to set 
aside free movement rules in order to preserve national regulatory autonomy. To begin with, all 
national business regulations dealing with “marketing modalities” or “selling arrangements”, e.g. 
                                                                                                                                                              
to avoid the proliferation of alcoholic beverages with a low alcohol content since such products, in the view of the 
German government, may more easily induce a tolerance towards alcohol than more highly alcoholic beverages. 
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restrictions on advertising,  restrictions on sales outlets, etc., are now excluded, as a matter of 
principle, from European scrutiny. 84 If a national regulation falls within the scope of EC law, a 
Member State can now refer to an extensive list of public interests to defend it. In addition to 
those public interests enunciated in Cassis, the European Court of Justice has recognised that a 
Member State can justify a “neutral” regulation having an adverse impact on trade on the 
following grounds: the protection of the working environment; the protection of cinema as form 
of cultural expression; the protection of national or regional socio-cultural characteristics; the 
maintenance of the plurality of the press; preventing the risk of seriously undermining the 
financial balance of the social security system; the protection of fundamental rights.85 In addition, 
it should not be forgotten that even discriminatory measures can be justified by reference to the 
exceptions contained in Article 30 TEC: public morality; public policy or public security; the 
protection of health and life of humans, animals or plants; the protection of national treasures and 
the protection of industrial and commercial policy. Finally, and most importantly, at the 
balancing stage, when a national measure restricting trade has to be justified, the European Court 
of Justice now admits more easily that the free movement of goods can be restricted in order to 
accommodate, for instance, social rights and policies.86  
63. To conclude on “negative integration”, Cassis de Dijon should not be understood as opening 
the way to a destructive regulatory competition. Undeniably, “if applied without any 
qualification, there is a danger that mutual recognition would lead to a race to the bottom, and to 
a deregulation of standards”. 87 However, “the danger of a race to the bottom is acknowledged 
within EC law on free movement”88 as it allows Member States to preserve discriminatory or 
indirectly discriminatory regulations when such rules are necessary for the defence of a public 
interest. The somewhat uncompromising attitude of the European Court of Justice until the 
beginning of the nineties, in the majority of cases dealing with free movement of goods, has to be 
                                                 
84 See Cases C-267-8/91 Keck and Mithouard  [1993] ECR I-6097. This is not to say that the case law is always 
consistent or straightforward.  
85 See respectively Case 155/80 Oebel [1981] ECR 3409; Case 60/84 Cinethèque [1985] ECR 2605; Case 145/88 
Torfaen Borough Council v. B & Q [1989] ECR 3851; Case C-368/95 Vereinigte Familiapress [1997] ECR I-3689; 
Case C-120/95 Decker v Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés [1998] ECR I-1831; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger 
[2003]. 
86 For a stimulating account, see Miguel Poiares Maduro, “Striking the Elusive Balance between Economic Freedom 
and Social Rights in the EU”, in Philip Alston (ed), The EU and Human Rights (Oxford, OUP, 1999), p. 449. 
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understood in light of the ever present temptation for national authorities to unfairly defend 
national producers by hiding behind the alleged defence of a public interest.  
64. A comical example is provided by the “beer purity” case decided in 1987.89 Germany tried to 
stop the importation of foreign beers on the ground that they failed to meet its beer purity 
standards. German authorities defended the legislation by arguing that additives could constitute 
a public health risk for a person who drinks in excess of 1,000 litres of beer a year.90 To preserve 
the benefits of a common market and limit the potentiality of any “free-rider” strategy, the 
European Court of Justice had to make sure Member States play by the rules defined in 1957 and 
which have been further refined by a succession of amending Treaties. It does not mean, for 
instance, that “pure beers” cannot be produced in Germany. It merely forbids Germany to 
prohibit the importation of “impure” beers and leaves to the German consumer the freedom to 
choose.  
65. To be sure, the Member States only express discontent when they are the object of European 
scrutiny. Indeed, not unsurprisingly but hardly ever noticed, when their partners are censured for 
hindering the selling of the goods they produce, there is no more talk about the European Court 
of Justice’s dogmatism. In any case, the European Court of Justice is now more sensitive to the 
dangers arising from the direct (legal) effect of negative integration on national problem-solving 
capacities. In the sectors of social and process regulations discussed in Scharpf’s work,91 the 
broad picture is one of a careful Court unwilling to condemn national regulations unless the 
protectionist intent or effect is manifest. Furthermore, as Miguel Poiares Maduro points it out, “if 
one takes the Europe majority policy as the yardstick by which to judge the impact of free 
movement rules on regulation, then there has been hardly any deregulation as a consequence of 
the application of free movement provisions.”92 Were the Constitutional Treaty to enter into 
force, the European Court of Justice will be formally obliged to take into account the new general 
social clause and therefore, to continue balancing the goal of market integration with a broad set 
of public interests.  
                                                 
89 Case 178/84 Commission v. Germany [1987] ECR 1227. 
90 See the opinion of the Advocate General Slynn. 
91 Governing in Europe, op. cit. 
92 “Striking the Elusive Balance between Economic Freedom and Social Rights in the EU”, op. cit., p. 455. 
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66. Even if the Treaty provisions aimed at removing trade barriers are now well and effectively 
balanced with a wide range of competing objectives and interests, it is further argued by social-
democrat critics of the EU, that the ease with which capital and work can move from a state to 
another continues to lead to regulatory competition, increasing the pressure on the Member States 
willing to defend existing levels of national regulation and social protection. The unfortunate 
aspect of European integration, it is alleged, is that national authorities cannot rely on any 
European “re-regulation” to regain some room for manoeuvre. Indeed, due to the cumbersome 
character of the European decision-making process and deep ideological differences among 
Member States, interventionist policies aimed at managing regulatory competition can hardly be 
defined and much less agreed upon. To quote once again Fritz Scharpf, at the European level, the 
institutional capacity for negative integration is supposedly “stronger than the capacity for 
positive integration, interventionist policies, and the interests they could serve, are systematically 
disadvantaged in the process of European integration”. 93  
67. Before exploring further the reality of a “race to the bottom”, a preliminary caveat must be 
introduced. In the author’s opinion, much in line with Scharpf’s own reasoning, negative  
integration should be accompanied by “positive” measures not only to make sure the market 
functions properly but also to eventually correct regulatory competition through harmonisation 
measures, e.g. in the form of minimum European standards. From such an “interventionist” 
perspective, European legislation should at the very least provide common standards to guarantee 
a level playing field and avoid social or fiscal dumping. Yet, before discussing any eventual 
European “re-regulation” and the delicate issue of when disparities between the laws of the 
Member States give a competitive advantage to states with lower standards, the reality of a race 
to the bottom should be first substantiated. 
 
(2) The Issue of “Fiscal Dumping” 
 
68. To the probable surprise of many well- intentioned critics, a “race to the top” seems in reality 
to prevail in Europe in some significant areas such as health and industrial safety, environmental 
                                                 
93 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe, op. cit., p. 49. 
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risks, gender equality and consumer protection. 94 Yet, regarding taxation, such a race to the top 
does not appear to have materialised. On the contrary, Member States give the impression of 
competing against each other to attract or to retain capital by lowering their corporate tax rate. 
How can these two different situations be explained? To follow the insightful analysis of Andrew 
Moravcsik,  
“[t]he major difference between apparently intractable issues of EU discussion such as social and tax 
harmonization, and similar issues where European regulation is effective, such as worker health and safety, 
appears not to lie in constitutional structure but in the precise nature of conflicts of interest among national 
governments. In the case of taxation, some governments remain deeply opposed to the harmonization of 
taxation and social welfare, whereas there are few die -hard defenders of unilateralism in matters of worker 
health and safety or pollution abatement.”95  
Accordingly, the EU cannot be said to inherently suffer from a neo- liberal bias, embodied in its 
constitutional structure. To simplify, the EU can merely accomplish what a super-majority of 
Member States want it to accomplish and then, a race to the top is feasible. Furthermore, even in 
the taxation field, it is tempting to argue that the reality of a race to the bottom is not as clear-cut 
as commonly assumed. It is important to stress that critics here complain about the lack of 
European harmonisation. When examining the 2004 Commission’s proposal on the liberalisation 
of services, we shall discover that the same critics also complain about European harmonisation 
when it does not fit their ideological preferences. But let’s focus for the moment on the fiscal 
dumping now allegedly taking place in Europe. 
69. Small Member States have been tempted to cut corporate tax rates to attract firms. It is a 
sensible strategy as long as the reduction is accompanied by an increase in total revenue. Ireland 
successfully implemented this strategy after deciding to introduce a 12.5 per cent uniform rate of 
profits tax. Several new Member States are busy trying to emulate the example of the Celtic 
Tiger. Estonia went as far as giving up any taxation on profits while Poland is experiencing an 
increasing popular solution: the flat tax system where income tax, corporation tax, and VAT are 
subject to the same rate of 18 per cent. The corporate tax rate is respectively 35 and 33 per cent in 
                                                 
94 On the competitive pressures on national regulatory systems induced by economic introduction, see the special 
issue of the Journal of European Public Policy with in particular an introductory presentation by Fritz Scharpf, 
“Introduction: The Problem Solving Capacity of Multi-level Governance” (1997) 4 Journal of European Public 
Policy 520. 
95 Andrew Moravcsik, “In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit: Reassessing Legitimacy in the European Union” 
(2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 603, at 618-619. 
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Germany and France. To retain their firms and possibly attract foreign investments, France and 
Germany have also envisaged bringing down their corporate tax rates. Speaking for Angela 
Merkel, in the 2005 German federal elections campaign, Mr Kirchhof, a university professor and 
a former judge of the Federal Constitutional Court, called for a new flat income tax of 25 per cent 
and a corporate tax cut to 22 per cent. Furthermore, in stark contrast to the position adopted by 
the former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder and constant French policy, he controversially 
declared that he “would never support guidelines against so-called tax dumping. Every country 
has autonomy in the sense of its own legislation and every country should strive to be better than 
the others.”96 
70. From the point of view of those willing to preserve a sufficiently large tax base to maintain a 
viable welfare system and convinced that social justice and equity justify substantial taxes on 
capital, this trend amounts to a vicious circle as all Member States will eventually end up with 
less revenue from capital owners.97 Worse, in the name of job creation or job maintenance, 
Member States are always tempted to subsidize firms as the Intel affair in Ireland demonstrates. 
The result is that not only do states collect less money from capital owners, they also give away 
taxpayers’ money. Regarding the latter aspect, thanks to the EC Treaty, the European 
Commission is empowered to control state subsidies with the principle of undistorted 
competition. However, and it can be perfectly be regretted, “no such criteria are as yet applied to 
competitive general reductions of the tax rates applying to capital incomes and businesses.”98 I 
should note in passing this again demonstrates that competition law should not be seen as the 
enemy of social protection. On the contrary, what is needed is a stronger enforcement of the 
current provisions against abuses of private power and unfair public subsidies as well as a 
broadening of its scope at the European level, to cover “competitive general reductions of the tax 
rates” suggested by Fritz Scharpf. It may then be easier for citizens to understand that 
competition law is all about guaranteeing a level playing field.  
                                                 
96 Quoted by Derek Scally, “CDU rejects tax harmonisation”, The Irish Times, September 6, 2005. The policy 
choices advocated by Paul Kirchhof proved to be so controversial and politically damaging for Angela Merkel that 
the shadow Finance Minister had to publicly declare before polling day that he will remain in the academia.  
97 For the moment, however, Ireland enjoys the benefits of being one of the few countries pursuing a strategy of 
development based on a low corporation tax rate. In 2002, Ireland raised more  corporate taxes as a 
percentage of GDP (about 3.7 per cent) than any of the other 15 countries reviewed in the 2005 Report of the Irish 
National Competitiveness Council. By contrast, in Germany, corporate taxes do not even reach 1 per cent of GDP 
while, in France, they represent close to 3 per cent. See National Competitiveness Council, The Competitiveness 
Challenge 2005, figure 2.1, p. 24, report available at: www.forfas.ie/ncc. 
98 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe, op. cit., p. 100.  
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71. The vehement opposition of Ireland and the United Kingdom to any harmonisation of 
corporate taxation at the EU level makes it highly unlikely that Member States will ever agree to 
such an extension of the scope of European competition law. Yet, to remedy to what it sees as 
fiscal or tax dumping, the French government has proposed the harmonisation of the rules under 
which corporate tax is calculated throughout the EU. Four Member States out of twenty five have 
expressed their opposition, as they do not want the emergence of harmonised corporate tax rates 
through the back door. Ireland and the United Kingdom were, of course, part of this group, along 
with Malta and Slovakia.99 Mr McCreevy, then the Irish finance minister said:  
“We are against it . Any methodology that would lead to harmonised tax rates, either through the front door 
or through the backdoor, is against the EU constitution.”100  
And truly, Mr McCreevy is right. More exactly, the Constitutional Treaty does not alter the 
current situation: unanimity remains the general rule for all tax-related matters. Were the 
Constitutional Treaty to enter into force, the preservation of the current status quo is therefore to 
be expected. Quite shamefully, when the constitutional text was being drafted, Ireland went as far 
as to constantly oppose harmonisation in matters relating to tax fraud and tax evasion. The fear of 
opening the door to more harmonisation overrode any consideration of the common good. On the 
other hand, it is clear that France intends to use its proposal as a first step to fight for the issue of 
taxation harmonisation.  
72. Another proposal is worth mentioning. Mr Nicolas Sarkozy suggested that Member States 
with an unusual low corporate tax rates should not benefit from European structural funds, these 
funds representing a third of the EU’s budget. This call was widely denounced and rightly so. 
First and foremost, policies embodying European solidarity should be preserved and 
implemented exclusively with regard to socio-economic criteria. Second, a country may need to 
compensate for other handicaps it may have in order to attract investment. In the case of Ireland 
or Estonia, for instance, their geographical isolation ought to be compensated in some way. Yet, 
these Member States must realise they play a dangerous game when they oppose, not on 
ideological grounds but merely to preserve their competitive advantage, any proposal to introduce 
a minimum corporate tax throughout the EU, say, a 10 per cent rate for the poorest countries with 
a superior threshold for the richest countries. A minimum corporate tax rate would demonstrate 
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that all Member States realise that Europe is a community of destiny and that national well-being 
cannot be sought at the expense of your neighbours. 
73. Nevertheless, the extent of tax dumping should not be overstated. Investments and the 
maintenance of jobs do not exclusively depend on taxation rates. France, where you find the most 
vociferous voices against “globalisation”, is still among the group of countries receiving the 
largest share of foreign investments. In 2002, for instance, it ranked number two worldwide for 
investment inflows just behind China. It also ranked number two in Europe, behind the United 
Kingdom and in front of Ireland, for job creation from foreign direct investment.101 In addition, 
the exodus of jobs to low-cost destinations appears unfounded despite the fears propagated by the 
former Socialist prime minister of France, Mr Laurent Fabius, who spent his time during the 
referendum campaign arguing that the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty would further 
favour the relocation of French companies to low tax countries in Central and Eastern Europe. A 
recent study, analysing a period running from 1995 to 2001, claims that only 2.4 per cent of the 
3.9 million of people employed in France in the manufacturing sector have been “outsourced” 
during this period.102 To put it differently, merely 0.35 per cent of industrial jobs were suppressed 
to be created abroad, and that means, in absolute numbers, approximately one job out of three 
hundred. Another unexpected conclusion is that only half of these jobs created abroad are 
actually located in “low-cost” countries. The other jobs emigrated to Spain, Italy, Germany and 
the United States. Although authoritative figures have yet to be offered, it is extremely unlikely 
that the 2004 enlargement has resulted in a massive exodus of jobs from the “old” to the “new” 
Europe.  
74. Irrespective of the complex and surprising realities of outsourcing, it cannot be denied that 
taxes on business and capital incomes, a trend initiated at the beginning of the eighties, have 
progressively and continuously diminished as a source of government revenue in the “old” 
Member States with extensive welfare obligations, to the detriment of immobile factors of 
production, meaning the workers. To guarantee existing levels of public services while 
maintaining a decent level of public debt, taxes on labour and/or taxes on consumption have 
                                                 
101 See www.investinfrance.org.  
102 See, Patrick Aubert et Patrick Sillard, Délocalisations et réductions d'effectifs dans l'industrie française (1995-
2001) , INSEE, No. G 2005/03, April 2005, available at: www.insee.fr. Another very informative report largely 
confirms these findings and exposes the numerous myths associated with “outsourcing”: Assemblée des Chambres 
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increased to compensate for the amount lost with regard to companies and capital owners. 
Assuming that tax competition ought to be blamed, and it appears indeed that despite the 
reduction in corporate income tax rates, the revenue from corporate taxation is increasing in 
Ireland or in the new Member States, what are the potential solutions as far as Europe is 
concerned? A first solution may lie in the setting up of a minimum corporate tax rate at Union 
level or different thresholds that would be linked to the level of development.103 Alternatively, if 
no agreement is possible for ideological or purely selfish reasons, the Member States should seek 
to develop a law of “unfair regulatory competition”. It has been suggested that the Commission 
and the European Court of Justice should be empowered to intervene “against competitive tax 
concessions, competitive forms of deregulation, and similar practices. The criterion in every case 
would be Kantian: given the preferences of the adopting country, would measures of this kind 
become self-defeating if they were simultaneously adopted by all other countries?”104  
75. Ideologically compatible with economic liberalism, it would be much more difficult for 
Ireland and the United Kingdom to oppose, normatively and politically speaking, the 
development of a set of rules aimed at guaranteeing “fair competition” than to reject proposals to 
directly harmonise taxation at the European level. The EU would then be in the position to limit 
eventual tax dumping, with the political advantage that citizens may come to better realise that 
the EU is a genuine community of shared destiny and an effective framework to manage the most 
perturbing changes induced by the globalisation of the economy. In the areas of social-policy 
regulation (e.g. working hours, employment security), ironically, it is not the lack of European 
rules that many have come to regret. On the contrary, the European Commission is now being 
accused of actively favouring “social dumping” by pushing forward a draft Directive aimed at 
liberalising services throughout Europe.  
 
B. – The “Frankenstein” Draft Directive on Services 
 
                                                 
103 See e.g. Ruud de Mooij, “Does the Enlarged European Union Need a Minimum Corporate Tax Rate?” (2004) 39 
Intereconomics 180. The author argues that by putting a floor on the tax rate, Europe may avoid a potential harmful 
tax race to the bottom. As long as the minimum rate is not too “high”, the disciplining impact of tax competition will 
not be lost. 
104 Fritz Scharpf, Governing in Europe, op. cit., p. 198. 
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76. In addition to propagating fears about imminent job losses to the benefit of the new “low-
cost” Member States, some prominent French socialists took the debate on the Constitutional 
Treaty to spread, to the visible delight of Jean-Marie Le Pen, fantasies about the likely invasion 
of “Polish plumbers”. More recently, in Ireland, the Labour Party leader, Pat Rabbitte, decided to 
emulate his humanist colleagues from the French left. He suggested without any hard evidence 
that migrant workers from Eastern Europe were causing a displacement of Irish workers and the 
erosion of pay and working conditions in Ireland; hence the so-called “race to the bottom”. 105 
This is not obviously the first time critics misrepresented the EU in light of the enlargement in 
May 2004 to ten Eastern European countries. Before the social dumping discourse, some 
unprincipled leaders made it their personal business to emphasise the fact that hordes of “welfare 
tourists” were about to abuse our cherished national welfare systems. It obviously did not happen 
and similarly, the adoption of the so-called “Bolkestein Directive” on services in the internal 
market, also labelled the “Frankenstein Directive” by some inspired commentators, would not 
lead to a race to the bottom. 106 
77. To put the proposed draft Directive into context, it is worth remembering that the free 
movement of services is one the four fundamental principles underpinning the EU common 
market since 1957. Yet, almost fifty years later, cross-border trade in services still lags behind the 
trade in goods. Indeed, although services account for more than 70 per cent of the GDP in most 
Member States, cross-border trade in services only amounts to about 20 per cent of trade within 
the EU thanks to a good deal of protectionism and red tape. Convinced that greater economic 
growth and more jobs would follow greater trade and competition – the number of 600,000 jobs 
has been put forward – the Commission issued a draft Directive in January 2004 which seeks to 
encourage greater cross-border trade in services by providing a legal framework that will 
eliminate obstacles to the freedom of establishment, i.e. the right for service providers to establish 
their business in any Member State for an indefinite period, and to the freedom to provide 
services, i.e. the right to provide services on a temporary or periodical basis in a Member State in 
which the provider of services is not established. 
                                                 
105 See e.g. Editorial, “Attitude towards migrant workers”, The Irish Times, January 23, 2006.  
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78. The Bolkestein Directive has raised strident protests as regards the second objective. It has 
been widely alleged that the proposed liberalisation of the freedom to provide services, under the 
auspices of the “country of origin principle”, is likely to initiate a race to the bottom. A 
characteristic example of the (inaccurate) claims one may effortlessly find in the press is given by 
David Begg, general secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions:   
“What does not make sense is to allow service industries to base themselves in the low-cost accession 
countries and from there outsource jobs to provide services in the EU 15, on pay rates and conditions of 
employment which apply in the base country. This is a crazy proposition which would cause great 
resentment and potentially undermine support for the European project. … Unless our social model is robust 
enough to protect these most vulnerable people, it is only a matter of time before everyone joins the “race to 
the bottom”.”107 
79. Before exposing the statement’s inaccuracies, the rationale behind the country of origin 
principle should be exposed. It is important to bear in mind that the European Parliament 
adopted, by a large majority, in February 2006, a largely revised version of the Commission’s 
initial draft proposal. The country of origin principle has been formally dropped. MEPs have 
replaced it with a new clause entitled “freedom to provide services”. It remains to be seen 
however if this new clause is more than a terminological change. Furthermore, the Council of 
Ministers has yet to decide its positions and it retains the power to reject any of the European 
Parliament’s amendments. The debate on the “country of origin principle is therefore likely to stir 
up passions for a little while.   
 
(1) The Country of Origin Principle 
 
80. The country of origin principle is aimed at helping small and medium sized enterprises to test 
the market before eventually setting up in business on a permanent basis. To ease the burdens 
involved with doing business in another Member State, it is foreseen that any company which 
provides services in one country is automatically qualified to provide services in any other 
Member State on the basis – here is the Gordian knot – of home-country regulation. Under this 
principle, a business which provides services in the Member State in which it is established is 
                                                 
107 David Begg, “Barroso intent on shifting EU to right of centre”, The Irish Times, February 7, 2005. 
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qualified to provide services on a temporary basis in any other Member State according to the 
regulations of its home Member State. Although the 2004 draft Directive includes provision for a 
number of important exceptions to the application of the principle (consumer contracts for 
instance) as well as complete derogations (twenty three in total) for sectors such as health and 
other “public services”, opponents continue to express fears about social dumping. In short, the 
argument runs “that if the new EU Member States can compete in the market for services on an 
equal basis without applying the often higher social rights as well as health and safety and 
environmental standards of some of the EU 15, the lowest level of standards in the European 
Union will become the norm.”108 
81. The key issue is obviously how to interpret the country of origin principle and whether or not 
it is a new principle. Before addressing the concerns about the country of origin principle, the 
right of establishment and the freedom to provide services must be briefly distinguished from 
each other. The right of establishment is well-established.109 As previously mentioned, the right 
of establishment ensures that nationals and companies of one Member State can freely move to 
another Member State in order to carry out activities as self-employed persons and to set up and 
manage companies. Also protected by the EC Treaty since 1957,110 the freedom to provide 
services implies that any self-employed person has the right to undertake, on a temporary basis, 
an important feature often neglected by the usual pundits, any economic activity normally 
performed for remuneration within the EU. In both cases, it is well established that EU law 
prohibits, unless justified by a public interest requirement, discriminatory but also non-
discriminatory national measures when they constitute an impediment to freedom of movement. 
82. The “country of origin principle” is only concerned with the freedom to provide services and 
not the right of establishment. This is an important point, too often misunderstood. Indeed, in the 
latter case, it is crystal-clear that any company willing to do business on a permanent basis in any 
Member State should do so through a fixed establishment and comply with all the rules of the 
host Member State. As for the fact that the draft Directive protects the right of companies of 
providing services on a temporary basis, i.e. without the need of establishing themselves in the 
                                                 
108 House of Lords, European Union Committee, Completing the Internal Market in Services, 6th Report of Session 
2005-06, 21 July 2005, para. 7. This Report should be singled out not only for the brilliant synthesis it operates but 
also for the diversity of evidence it offers.  
109 See Articles 43 to 48 TEC. 
110 See Articles 49 to 55 TEC. 
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Member States where they trade, there is nothing new here. It is argued, however, that the 
Bolkestein Directive goes further to the extent that the right to provide services would now 
guarantee a brand new country of origin principle. This is not entirely accurate. Indeed, not only 
does the principle already appear in several pieces of legislation, 111 the European Court of Justice 
has applied a similar principle in the field of the goods since 1978. As we have seen, in Cassis de 
Dijon, the European Court of Justice ruled that, in the absence of European rules, goods should 
freely circulate between Member States provided that they have been lawfully produced and 
marketed in one of the Member States. This idea is known as the principle of mutual recognition. 
The application of national rules hindering trade can only be justified by reference to a mandatory 
public interest. A similar logic governs the case law dealing with the freedom to provide services. 
For the European Court of Justice, in the absence of European-wide harmonisation, national rules 
hindering the freedom to provide services violate EU law unless they can be justified by the 
regulating state by overriding reasons relating to the public interest. More specifically, the Court 
has held that the application of the national legislation to foreign persons providing services 
ought to be strictly justified whenever that the requirements embodied in legislation are already 
satisfied by the rules imposed on those persons in the Member State in which they are 
established.”112 
83. Even though the country of origin principle is not a complete novelty, it is nonetheless 
reasonable to consider that the Bolkestein Directive, if adopted without drastic amendments, will 
denote an important policy shift as far as the regulation of the internal market is concerned. Faced 
with the political and legal intricacies of any attempt at harmonising the provision of services 
across Europe through a numerous set of sectoral directives, the Commission appears to have 
considered the country of origin principle as a second-best solution to revitalize the EU’s 
economy in a single shot. By eliminating a great deal of prior administrative authorisations, any 
EU-based company would be indeed automatically qualified (unless the sector falls within one of 
the many derogations explicitly provided for by the draft Directive) to provide services in any 
other Member State on the basis of home-country regulation. As a result, the Bolkestein Directive 
has been presented as a neo- liberal plot. More worrisome, some peculiar French left-wing 
humanists have propagated the view that it paves the way for an invasion of “Polish plumbers”. 
                                                 
111 See the TV without frontiers Directive (89/552/CEE) and the E-Commerce Directive (2000/31/CE). 
112 Case C-288/89 “Gouda” [1991] ECR I-4007, para. 13. 
(01/03/2006) 
 
    
© Laurent Pech  
53 
In less xenophobic terms, the argument runs that the application of the country of origin principle 
is going to lead to a race to the bottom most notably in the fields of workers’ rights and health 
and safety standards. For this author, the potential impact of the “Frankenstein Directive” has 
been undeniably exaggerated and it would be more appropriate to lay the blame at each country’s 
door for tolerating extravagant abuses of national labour standards.  
 
(2) The Issue of Social Dumping 
 
84. In defence of the “Bolkestein Directive”, it must first be said that critics forget that there is a 
great deal of European legislation setting minimum standards health and safety standards. The 
same is true regarding environmental protection. Accordingly, liberalisation of services cannot 
lead to a situation where a Member State lowers its health and safety standards or environmental 
standards to gain competitive advantage below the current European minimum standards. As for 
workers’ rights, it is astonishing to see that most critics do not realise that the Posted Workers 
Directive issued in 1996 regulates this area and precisely excludes the country of origin 
principle.113 In the terms of the Directive, it is intended to promote the transnational provision of 
services in a “climate of fair competition and measures guaranteeing respect for the rights of 
workers”. 114 And this is what it does by stipulating that posted workers will enjoy the application 
of certain minimum protective provisions in force in the Member State to which they are posted, 
regardless of the law applicable to the employment relationship. Accordingly, it provides that 
employees that are posted temporarily to a Member State other than their own will be subject to 
the labour law of the country in which they are employed. Rules dealing with working time, 
minimum paid annual holidays, minimum rates of pay, the conditions of hiring-out of workers 
and health, safety and hygiene at work should therefore be governed by the Member State in 
which they are employed.115  
                                                 
113 Directive 96/71/EC. A posted worker is defined as one who, for a limited period, carries out his work in the 
territory of a Member State other than the State in which he normally works. 
114 Recital 5.  
115 Article 3(1) of the Directive lays down the mandatory rules to be observed by employers during the period of 
posting in regard to the following issues: maximum work periods and minimum rest periods, minimum paid annual 
holidays, minimum rates of pay, the conditions of hiring-out of workers, in particular the supply of workers by 
temporary employment undertakings, health, safety and hygiene at work, protective measures with regard to the 
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85. In light of this Directive, the European Court of Justice has constantly emphasised that 
“Community law does not preclude a Member State from requiring an undertaking established in 
another Member State which provides services in the territory of the first Member State to pay its 
workers the minimum remuneration laid down by the national rules of that State.”116 When a 
French company set up by a Portuguese firm was caught in 2005 employing on a permanent 
basis, in France, Portuguese workers on almost Dickensian-type conditions on behalf of a major 
French firm, France Telecom, it was an obvious and shocking violation of French law as well as 
European law. 117 The trouble, in France, and this is certainly true in most Member States, is that 
the manpower of the French labour inspectorate, the department whose mission is to inspect 
companies for potential violation of labour regulations, has considerably shrunk over the years. 
Accordingly, numerous labour abuses, unlawful under national as well as European law, go 
unnoticed. Furthermore, in a situation of high unemployment, it is far from unusual to see 
politicians exerting great pressure on civil servants in order to convince them to show some 
“flexibility” when dealing with violating firms. They are often told that they should not 
“discourage” investment.  
86. It should also be stressed that detractors of the Bolkestein Directive seem rather ignorant 
about the fact that it is only relevant for services provided (a) temporarily (b) by those who are 
not employed by others, i.e. self employed persons rather than employees. As previously shown, 
the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive regulates the situation of employees. Accordingly, no firm 
can send a contingent of low-paid workers to do a job (requiring a stay of more than 7 days) in 
another Member State without being bound by the laws of the host country. As for the situation 
of self-employed persons now, when they work directly for consumers, they are subject to 
derogation from the “country of origin principle”. This means that self-employed persons must 
provide services under Irish law in Ireland, under French law in France, etc. So much therefore 
for the “Polish plumber”. In any case, anyone with a property in France would certainly be 
keenly aware of the fact that French plumbers are so few and well off that they hardly ever 
                                                                                                                                                              
terms and conditions of employment of pregnant women or women who have recently given birth, of children and of 
young people.  
116 See recently Case C-341/02, Commission v. Germany, April 14, 2005, para. 24. The European Court of Justice 
requires, however, that the application of such rules must be appropriate for securing the attainment of the objective 
which they pursue, that is to say, the protection of posted workers, and must not go beyond what is necessary in 
order to attain that objective. A case-by-case assessment is therefore required.  
117 See “Manifestations contre le travail au rabais”, Le Monde, May 24, 2005. 
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answer your phone call for immediate help. If only Polish plumbers could be convinced to 
provide their services, French citizens would likely benefit from increased quality of services as 
well as lower prices. The Polish Embassy in Paris should be congratulated for its sense of 
humour. After all the unpleasant comments uttered by ignorant politicians, it launched a tourist 
campaign advertising a blonde hunk carrying a monkey-wrench, allegedly a Polish plumber, who 
beckons French people to visit his country with the following slogan: “I am staying in Poland. 
Come on over.”  
87. In the end, only those who take on self-employed businesses providing a “commercial” 
service for a business customer in a different Member State will eventually come under the 
auspices of the country of origin principle. In this situation, were the Bolkestein Directive to be 
adopted in its 2004 version, the parties to a contract will be able to choose the law applicable to 
it. However, as previously said, if a company sends workers abroad to perform the contract for 
more than a week, the workers will then be subject to national labour laws. Furthermore, it is 
important to constantly stress that the application of the country of origin principle is linked to 
temporary provision of services in another country. Even though greater clarity is required about 
the precise meaning of “temporary” as opposed to “permanent”, the scope of liberalisation is 
therefore limited. Any firm or self-employed persons willing to do business in another Member 
State on a permanent basis must establish itself there and therefore is completely bound by the 
laws of the host country. 
88. Finally, the argument according to which the Bolkestein Directive is going to favour 
“outsourcing”, meaning the evasion of national law by national companies or self-employed 
persons as they move abroad to more “welcoming” Member States, again reveals a high level of 
ignorance. Companies have already the freedom to establish themselves wherever they want to 
with great ease.118 However, it should also be stressed that according to the case- law of the 
European Court of Justice, a Member State is obviously entitled to take measures designed to 
prevent certain of its nationals from attempting, under cover of the rights created by the Treaty, to 
improperly circumvent their national legislation or to prevent individuals from improperly or 
fraudulently taking advantage of provisions of EU law. In other words, national authorities can 
                                                 
118 See e.g. Case C-56/96 “VT4” [1997] ECR I-1459, para. 22: “The Treaty does not prohibit an undertaking from 
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take measures to prevent the exercise by a person providing services, whose activity is wholly or 
principally directed towards its territory, of the freedoms guaranteed by the EC Treaty for the 
purpose of avoiding the rules which would be applicable to him if he were established within that 
State.119 This is known as the “abuse evasion theory”. 120  
89. In the same vein, under the Bolkestein Directive, an Irish company registering its permanent 
office in Latvia, while it is manifest that it intends to carry out most of its business in Ireland, will 
not be able to rely on Latvian law in Ireland. This is not feasible today and it will not be allowed 
under the Services Directive. As soon as a company carries out business in a Member State on a 
permanent basis, it is bound by national rules no matter where it is formally established. Many 
French self-employed persons were once tempted to establish themselves in the UK, but they 
soon discovered that under French tax law, no matter your (legal) place of establishment, you 
must pay taxes and are subject to the law of the country where you effectively carry out your 
economic activity. The country of origin principle will not change that as it does not apply to 
companies or self-employed persons providing services on a permanent basis in the host Member 
State. In the same way, an Irish company may be tempted to bring in Latvian workers. They will 
be subject, nonetheless, to Irish labour law if they work in Ireland for more than a few days. To 
conclude, linking “outsourcing” and the Bolkestein Directive illustrates a profound 
misunderstanding of the draft Directive’s scope. In the field of services, one can hardly imagine 
the situation of Irish plumbers establishing themselves in Slovakia and willing to fly from time to 
time to work in Ireland for a business customer. Certainly, they will be covered by Slovakian law 
under the country of origin principle but the benefit of doing so remains highly evasive. If they 
carry out most of their economic activity in Ireland, they have no other option than to be bound 
by Irish law. The situation is identical for non-national businesses or their workers as soon as 
they undertake economic activity on a non-temporary basis.  
90. The discourse on “social dumping” eventually appears singularly misguided once one realises 
that the draft Directive on Services neither compels the Member States to liberalise public 
                                                 
119 See e.g. C-23/93 “TV 10” [1994] ECR I-4795. 
120 It remains, true, however that for the European Court of Justice, somewhat unconvincingly, a company which 
does not conduct any business in the Member State in which it has its registered office and pursues its activities only 
in the Member State where its branch is established is not sufficient to prove the existence of abuse or fraudulent 
conduct. This does not mean that the Member State where business is being exclusively conducted cannot deny that 
company the benefit of the provisions of Community law relating to the right of establishment. The Court requires 
instead that national authorities must prove on a case-by-case basis abuse or fraudulent conduct on the part of the 
persons concerned. See Case C-212/97 “Centros” [1999] ECR I-1459 
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services nor does it regulate the situation of posted workers. It is understandable therefore that 
Charlie McCreevy, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, has shown 
some irritation and said, in a statement to the European Parliament: “I don’t want to hear any 
more talk about so-called social dumping. This not what this proposal is about and we should put 
an end to this confusion.”121 The Commissioner is right. The draft Directive on Services will 
bring no change regarding the conditions and standards for workers. It will not allow companies 
to bring in “cheap” workers from other Member States and create a sort of unfair competition 
with national companies playing by the rules. In addition, it will not prevent the Member States 
from supervising companies and workers operating in their territory.  
91. True, the draft Directive foresees the suppression of any prior administrative authorisation 
before workers can be posted in another Member State and the duties it imposes on companies 
may be in real need of some tightening up. Yet, the Member State is left with an entire freedom 
to enforce its labour laws by means of on-spot checks or demanding all relevant information from 
the company posting workers in the country. For this author, rather than obsessively focusing on 
the Bolkestein directive, the discussion should address the insufficient enforcement by each 
individual Member State of the 1996 Posting of Workers Directive. It is essential to tirelessly 
repeat that it is the responsibility of the host Member State to conduct inspections and to enforce 
its employment and working rules as well as the relevant EU standards. If it cannot be denied that 
the posting of workers is an important economic phenomenon. Before the enlargement in 2004, 
about 120,000 workers have been posted in France.122 Such a phenomenon, however, does not 
bear any link with persisting high unemployment even though it may tempting for failed and self-
reproductive national elites to use this as a way of escaping their incompetence and predatory 
practices. The main problem, today, is the political unwillingness of most national governments 
to enforce these rules even in situations where violations of national rules are committed by or on 
behalf of national companies. The EU should not be blamed for the political preferences of 
national governments or their incompetence. The “Gama affair” illustrates this particularly well.  
92. Thanks to Mr Higgins, Socialist Party TD, Irish citizens were astonished to learn that Turkish 
construction workers on Irish projects were being paid between €2 and €3 an hour while working 
                                                 
121 Statement to the European Parliament on Services Directive, speech/05/149, Strasbourg, March 8, 2005. 
122 See the report issued by the French Senate on the Bolkestein Directive, Rapport d’information No. 206, session 
ordinaire de 2004-2005, 18 février 2005, p. 16. 
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for about eighty hours per week. Who is to blame for this “disgrace”, a term used by the Tánaiste, 
Ms Harney? Well, it seems that the Tánaiste herself is directly involved in this disgrace. Indeed, 
she failed during her period as Minister for Enterprise, Trade and Employment, to investigate 
complaints that she had received. Gama, a Turkish-based company, was actually bold enough to 
publicly affirm that it had come to Ireland on foot of an invitation by “some members of the Irish 
government and civil servants” who visited Turkey in June 2000.123 Since its arrival at the end of 
2000, the company has secured nearly €200 million worth of State contracts. EC law bears no 
responsibility whatsoever for this disgrace. Nor is it a question of insufficiently protective 
national legislation. Abuses of this sort will continue until something is done to make sure 
companies abide by the law, national and European for that matter. It all becomes a tragic joke 
when you actually realise how many workplace inspectors are employed by the Irish government 
– about 21 to police approximately two million workers.124   
93. The controversy surrounding Irish Ferries is also worth mentioning. David Begg offers once 
again a sad demonstration that the EU continues to be blamed even in situations where there is 
not the slightest reason to do so. For the general secretary of ICTU, if the proposed EU Services 
Directive becomes reality, “then the grotesque Irish Ferries scenario will become the norm”. To 
this extravagant nonsense, he added:  
“If anybody was in any doubt as to the impact of this crazy proposition - the Services Directive - they need 
look no further than Irish Ferries. The chief executive of Irish Ferries earned €687,000 last year. But he 
wants to dump 543 workers and replace them with people on around €3 per hour... there’s something deeply 
obscene about that.”125  
It is not our intention to deny that the earnings of this chief executive are certainly obscene and 
more generally, that the greedy behaviour of most CEOs in the past few years has done much 
more damage to liberalism than any army of Karl Marx’s followers would have been able to 
inflict. Our concern is that the EU, a body with limited powers, has simply not got the 
competence to pass legislation on salaries. Likewise, it would impossible to associate the EU 
                                                 
123 See Chris Dooley, “Gama secured 70% of PAYE relief scheme”, The Irish Times, May 18, 2005. 
124 See Paul Cullen, “Expansion of labour inspectorate planned”, The Irish Times, April 9, 2005. Since, the Minister 
for Enterprise, Micheál Martin has announced the appointment of 10 new labour inspectors, specifically to combat 
exploitation. See John Downes, “Gama case places the spotlight on our treatment of foreign workers”, The Irish 
Times, April 29, 2005. 
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with the fact that the average CEO, in most developed nations, now generally makes between 300 
and 500 times as much in pay as the average production-worker.126 Compare this to the situation 
in the 70s, when the average CEO pay represented about 25 times the pay of an average 
production-worker. As for the draft Services Directive, one has to show an astonishing lack of 
understanding to find a link between what it proposes to achieve and the Irish Ferries scenario. It 
would be more adequate to underscore the shameful acceptance by all governments of the 
practice of “flag-hopping”. It is a well-known fact that the world’s largest fleets belong to the 
Bahamas, Panama and Liberia, allowing ship owners to avoid paying taxes and to avoid labour 
and safety standards. It is also well established that a significant number of members of our 
national elites and obviously most multinationals, not to mention the 9/11 terrorists, have been 
enjoying the benefits of tax havens and other offshore financial centres. Incidentally, regarding 
the taxation of multinationals, one should note that even the US press is now accusing Ireland of 
becoming the Bermuda of Europe to the detriment of American taxpayers.127  
94. Rather than fighting against these capitalistic deviances, trade unionists spend a great deal of 
their time portraying the EU as some sort of neo- liberal Leviathan. Both terms are false. Trade 
unionists, and the workers they allegedly represent, have really nothing to gain from representing 
the Union as the enemy. In the case of Ireland, it is indisputable that workers have gained more 
rights thanks to the EU. And in relation to the fear of social dumping, one must not forget that the 
Celtic Tiger miracle partially derives from the initial “low-cost” of its labour force. In any case, it 
is regrettable that media do not rigorously scrutinise the “arguments” put forward by the 
opponents to the Bolkestein Directive. The latter text, as initially drafted, is certainly not perfect. 
Furthermore, it cannot be categorically denied that the posting of non-national workers, under the 
1996 Directive, is putting downward pressures on wages in some sectors where national workers 
used to get more than the minimum rates of pay. Yet, in all the cases of labour abuses agitating 
the media, the “disgrace” does not originate from the implementation of European norms but 
rather from the failure of the Member States to properly apply them alongside protective national 
legal standards.  
 
                                                 
126 See The Economist, “Executive pay. Too many turkeys”, November 26, 2005. 
127 See e.g. Glenn R. Simpson, “Irish units lets Microsoft cut taxes in US, Europe”, The Wall Street Journal, 
November 7, 2005. 
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95. The EU, as a political project, has suffered immense damage from the accusation of being a 
neo- liberal entity pursuing neo-liberal policies. Even its long-time devotees in Ireland or 
elsewhere lament the fact that the EU, “potentially the most civilised political project of our 
times”, has become the vehicle of a race to the bottom. 128 In claiming, however, that EU law 
allows for Latvian workers to work on less than half the minimum wage and without the 
protection of Irish labour law or in arguing that the Services Directive is now waved “around like 
holy scripture in which the almighty commission decrees that you can’t protect national standards 
of employment”, 129 commentators seem to trade stylistic considerations for accuracy.  
96. The neo- liberal caricature is highly unfortunate as not only the legal provisions upon which 
the EU is founded do not embody any neo- liberal bias, there is also little evidence to support that 
EU policies encourage a race to the bottom. In most instances, fantasies rather than facts govern 
the discussion as it is politically more convenient to blame an indeterminate “foreign” entity and 
eventually foreigners, than to confront national vested interests or address national failures to 
enforce the law of the land. Persisting massive unemployment and the financial troubles of our 
welfare systems are structural problems that have little to do with economic globalisation or 
enlargement. Unfortunately, the temptation is always present for national governments to point 
the finger at the EU for all their countries’ ills. The EU should not be seen, however, as a foreign 
body with its own (neo- liberal) will. It is a framework the Member States can rely on to confront 
collective challenges and threats. It is up to the Member States to ultimately agree on the 
definition of sound policies in order for Europe to preserve itself from unregulated economic 
competition. The provisions of the current Treaties, and a fortiori the provisions of the 
Constitutional Treaty, offer a balanced set of values and objectives. They do not presage, in 
themselves, a neo- liberal or socialist orientation. 
97. Instead of denouncing the supposed neo- liberal nature of the European Treaties, left- leaning 
critics should realise that ideological conflicts and divergent national interests are the genuine 
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obstacles to European “re-regulation” in the direction of a more “social Europe”. As for the cases 
of labour exploitation, European law should not be blamed. They are due to companies not 
abiding by the law or abusing it in a context of persisting high unemployment and illegal 
immigration and can only persist thanks to an extraordinary unwillingness of national authorities 
to enforce their own labour standards. To point the finger at European integration, the EU 
Constitutional Treaty or the new Member States may be too tempting for unprincipled politicians, 
yet, the situation is unfortunately more complex and in most cases, the first step to take will be to 
hold national authorities accountable for their failure to enforce their own law and put an end to 
legal loopholes. Ultimately, the key question, as far as the EU is concerned, is a relatively simple 
one to formulate: who would benefit from its weakening or worse, its demise? Certainly not the 
weakest and smallest.  
 
